



## CONTENTS

### CHRONOLOGICAL LIST of WITNESSES

	PAGE
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor to President Carter, 1977-1981, presently with the Center For Strategic and International Studies.	7
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 1981-1985.	44
Honorable Alan L. Keyes, Resident Scholar, The American Enterprise Institute; Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs; Former United States Representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council.	69
Alex Alexiev, Senior Soviet Analyst, Rand Corporation.	104

1 HEARING ON U.N.-SPONSORED PROXIMITY TALKS ON  
2 AFGHANISTAN

3 - - -

4 Thursday, February 18, 1988

5 Congress of the United States,  
6 Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan,  
7 Washington, D.C.

8 The Task Force met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in  
9 Room 385 of the Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon  
10 J. Humphrey, Chairman, presiding.

11 Present: Senators Humphrey and Hecht; Representatives  
12 McCollum, Wilson, and Ritter.

13 Senator Humphrey. Shall we begin?

14 Good morning. I wanted to welcome our distinguished  
15 witnesses to the ninth hearing of the Congressional Task  
16 Force on Afghanistan.

17 The purpose of this hearing is to examine the role of  
18 the United States in any negotiated settlement of the war in  
19 Afghanistan. For the next round of the UN-sponsored talks  
20 scheduled for March 2nd, we are at a critical juncture.

21 In my view the State Department so far has thoroughly  
22 botched things. Without the approval, without indeed the  
23 knowledge of President Reagan, the fellows from Foggy Bottom  
24 have offered the Soviets a one-sided deal.

Moscow need only begin withdrawal, and the United States

1 will cut off all aid--repeat: all aid--immediately. If the  
2 Soviets have deceit and double cross in mind, they must be  
3 delighted with the State Department agreeing to cut off aid  
4 entirely upon the withdrawal of the first Soviet unit.

5       Neville Chamberlain himself could not have been more  
6 generous in designing such an agreement.

7       A brief history. In December of 1985, the Deputy  
8 Secretary of State announced that the United States would  
9 serve as the guarantor of a negotiated settlement. The  
10 President now learns that such a guarantee would obligate the  
11 United States to end all assistance to the Afghanistan  
12 freedom fighters before Soviet troops have fully left  
13 Afghanistan.

14       In other words, 60 days after signing an agreement, the  
15 Soviets would be obligated to begin withdrawing their troops,  
16 and the United States and other interested parties, must end  
17 all outside assistance.

18       Further, the UN agreements say nothing about an end to  
19 Soviet assistance to the puppet government which they have  
20 erected in Kabul. Therefore, while the United States is  
21 obligated to ensure all outside assistance to the freedom  
22 fighters is cut off, the Soviets would apparently have ten  
23 months, if that is the agreed schedule, during which time  
24 they would be perfectly free to fully and continuously  
25 resupply their own forces and that of the puppet government.

1 Recently, in the Senate a bipartisan group of 25  
2 Members, including 7 Members of the Foreign Relations  
3 Committee, the present and former chairmen of the Intelligence  
4 Committee, have signed a letter to the President protesting a  
5 cutoff of aid to the freedom fighters at the outset of a  
6 withdrawal.

7 In my view the State Department has already gone a long  
8 way toward selling out the Afghan freedom fighters, and  
9 unless President Reagan can find a way to substantially  
10 modify our commitment under the present agreement, the  
11 Administration could well find that it has thrown away at the  
12 bargaining table the gains won by the people of Afghanistan  
13 at enormous cost of blood and suffering.

14 Let me just point out that a recent French-government-  
15 funded study concluded that a million and a quarter Afghans  
16 had died as a result of the Soviet occupation. That is the  
17 equivalent of about 17 or 18 million dead Americans. That is  
18 impossible for us to imagine. But for the Afghan, that level  
19 of suffering is more than a matter of imagination; it is a  
20 matter of daily reality.

21 President Reagan must take charge. For what is at stake  
22 is not only the future of Afghanistan, but the future of the  
23 Reagan doctrine as well, which is on the verge of succeeding  
24 brilliantly in Afghanistan if we can keep the State Department  
25 from further mucking things up.

1 Finally, let me note that the State Department has  
2 refused once again to send a witness to this hearing. For  
3 the duration of the hearing we will reserve an empty chair at  
4 the table for the State Department in hopes, however small,  
5 that we might have a witness from that Department.

6 The empty chair will also serve as a reminder of the  
7 State Department's empty headed approach to the Afghanistan  
8 negotiations.

9 Senator Hecht?

10 Senator Hecht. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the  
11 opportunity to be here today.

12 In 50 years of spreading communism, Afghanistan looms as  
13 a bright point, a turning point, which perhaps the Free World  
14 can now start achieving some success.

15 We have made great strides in the fields in Afghanistan,  
16 in the countryside. Now we must not lose what we have won on  
17 the battlefield at the peace table.

18 Poland and other Soviet bloc countries also hang in this  
19 balance. I congratulate you, Senator Humphrey, for bringing  
20 this to the attention of Washington, and to people all around  
21 the world. And I am anxious to hear our esteemed witnesses  
22 today.

23 Thank you for inviting me.

24 Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Senator Hecht.

25 Congressman McCollum.

1 Mr. McCollum. Thank you very much, Senator Humphrey.

2 It seems to me we have gotten to a point of great  
3 interest to everybody now in this whole matter. The Soviets  
4 are desirous for the reasons that I think are the pressures  
5 we have put on them to leave Afghanistan.

6 And the question before us and before those who are  
7 involved in negotiating the matters, President Zia, Secretary  
8 Shultz, many others with the Soviets, is, what's going to  
9 happen afterwards?

10 And that is so critical to this. After all, the  
11 Mujahideen, the freedom fighters, the people who really are  
12 the people of Afghanistan, their lives, their future, as well  
13 as our national security interest and the security interest  
14 of our allies, is at stake here.

15 So I am looking forward to hearing from our distinguished  
16 panel of witnesses about their views on this delicate time  
17 and how we are proceeding and how we should be proceeding.

18 I am sure all of us up here are not completely positive  
19 of what is in the minds at the moment of those who are going  
20 to be doing the negotiating. But we are concerned, and we do  
21 have a sense, that whatever happens now, we must not make a  
22 grave mistake in the process.

23 Thank you very much, Senator Humphrey.

24 (The prepared Statement of Representative David Dreier  
follows:)

Mr. Dreier. I want to thank Senator Humphrey for his foresight in calling this hearing on the United Nations-sponsored proximity talks on Afghanistan and U.S. policy toward a negotiated settlement to the Afghan war. I am also especially pleased to have such a distinguished panel of witnesses joining us today. Their testimony will provide important information on the direction which U.S. foreign policy should take in South Asia. I believe this hearing comes at a critically important time for the Afghan mujahidin and the Afghan people.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's recent assurances of a decision to withdraw 120,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan are intended to make the West believe that the Afghan's nine-year-old struggle against the Soviet invaders will soon end. While the prospect of a removal of foreign troops from this war-torn country is certainly a cause for hope, it is important for Congress and the American people to understand that a withdrawal of Soviet troops alone is not the solution to ending the bloodshed in Afghanistan. A troop withdrawal must be preceded by a resolution of the makeup of an interim Afghan government.

The puppet government in Kabul has lost its moral authority by witnessing and countenancing the slaughter of its people, the maiming of its children, and the occupation of its nation. As such, Pakistan's President Zia and the Afghan resistance are justified in their firm opposition to the current regime. Any withdrawal of Soviet troops which



would leave in place the current government would only result in the continued oppression of the Afghan people. It follows that the Afghan resistance would simply be forced to exchange their war against the Soviet invaders for a civil war against the Soviet surrogates in Kabul.

Although the Soviets are willing to negotiate a timetable for withdrawal, they argue that the formation of an interim government is an internal matter and not within the jurisdiction of the proximity talks. Fortunately, President Zia is insisting that he will only negotiate with an interim Afghan government, and not with the Soviet puppet government. The United States must back President Zia in his call for an interim government to insure an orderly transition to an Afghan-controlled government following a Soviet disengagement.

Since it is virtually impossible to guarantee that any Soviet withdrawal would be irreversible, we must make the stakes connected with a Soviet reentry so high that the Soviet would not risk such a move. The Afghan people have paid dearly for self-determination and we must stand by them until their victory over communist aggression is secured.

Next week I plan to introduce a concurrent resolution urging President Reagan to continue our commitment to the Afghan resistance until the Soviets leave Afghanistan and there is genuine self-determination for the Afghan people. I hope that my colleagues on the Task Force will join me in this effort.

Again, I thank Senator Humphrey for calling this hearing and our distinguished witnesses for their contribution to this important debate.

1        Senator Humphrey. And indeed, we do have a distinguished  
2 list of witnesses--a list of distinguished witnesses, I  
3 should say: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ambassador Jeanne  
4 Kirkpatrick, Ambassador Alan Keyes, and Alex Alexiev, in that  
5 order.

6        And we will first turn to Dr. Brzezinski. Doctor, thank  
7 you very much for coming to be with us. Again, this is not  
8 your first appearance before the Task Force.

9        We value very highly your views, and look forward to  
10 hearing your testimony.

1 STATEMENT OF ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, FORMER NATIONAL  
2 SECURITY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT CARTER, 1977-1981,  
3 PRESENTLY WITH THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND  
4 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

5 Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me  
6 begin by making a few comments regarding the situation in the  
7 war for Afghanistan, and the implications for the war of the  
8 recent diplomatic moves that have taken place in the run up  
9 to the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva in early  
10 March.

11 In my testimony today, Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to  
12 prejudge the sincerity of the recent statement made by  
13 General Secretary Gorbachev. I have consistently argued that  
14 if the United States and the other supporters of the Afghan  
15 resistance continued to raise the military and political  
16 costs of the war to Moscow, the point would come when the  
17 Brezhnev might choose to disengage.

18 We may have reached that point, although uncertainties  
19 remain. In his speech Gorbachev made some important initial  
20 concessions. We need to seek further changes, but I do  
21 believe that his proposal can be used as the partial point of  
22 departure for further negotiations.

23 Our goal must be a settlement that involves a withdrawal  
24 of the Soviet Union's occupation army, and that secures the  
25 right of self-determination of the Afghan people.

1       Such a settlement is in the interests of the Afghan  
2 people, and in the interests of those countries who have a  
3 strategic stake in Afghanistan. I believe we should do what  
4 we can to advance that goal through the proximity talks, but  
5 without engaging in wishful thinking, or in ignoring the very  
6 real differences that continue to divide the two sides.

7       It is to those outstanding issues that I will focus my  
8 remarks. But before taking up these issues, I wish to make  
9 one more general point.

10       As we move to take advantage of Gorbachev's new proposal,  
11 we must not foreclose the possibility that through these  
12 moves he seeks to attain at the negotiating table what he has  
13 failed to achieve on the battlefield.

14       It is conceivable that Gorbachev is trying to transform  
15 his problem in Afghanistan into our problem. He might be  
16 trying to shift attention away from the question of the  
17 presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and toward negotiat-  
18 ing a complicated structure that would legitimize Moscow's  
19 present determinant role in the internal affairs of Afghanistan,  
20 and that would enable his military forces to leave while  
21 Moscow retains political control, and while the talks  
22 precipitate a split between us and the resistance, and even  
23 perhaps Pakistan.

24       In this regard, a recent book, edited by Rosanne Klass  
25 at Freedom House, Afghanistan: the Great Game Revisited,

1 offers some persuasive evidence to the effect that the talks  
2 in Geneva might be but a gambit in a larger strategy to  
3 prevail in Afghanistan.

4 Thus, while we should proceed with the talks, we must  
5 not let that happen.

6 Turning to the issues, I believe that there are two  
7 critical issues that still need to be addressed in the  
8 proximity talks. The first is a Soviet withdrawal timetable  
9 and the termination of outside aid to the resistance.

10 The second is the question of whether an accord is to be  
11 signed with the parent Kabul regime, or with some kind of a  
12 transitional government.

13 As far as the first issue is concerned, the current  
14 Soviet proposal calls for a 10-month withdrawal in which 50  
15 percent of Soviet forces leave within the first three months,  
16 and during which Soviet forces would be prohibited from  
17 undertaking offensive actions.

18 Furthermore, it calls for a cutoff of outside aid to the  
19 Afghanistan resistance at the start of the Soviet withdrawal.

20 All of this under Gorbachev's proposal would be agreed  
21 upon by March 15th, and the aid cutoff and the withdrawal,  
22 would begin on May 15th.

23 It is my view that if we are to accept the 10 months  
24 timetable, or perhaps compromise on a 9-month timetable,  
25 since the Pakistani position right now is 8 months, we should

still insist on two changes on Gorbachev's proposed formula.

First, we cannot accept the stipulation that terminates our assistance to the Afghans at the start of the Soviet withdrawal. We should agree to phase-out but not to a cutoff of our aid.

I would favor an offer to reduce our aid in direct proportion to the reduction of Soviet manpower in Afghanistan. If Gorbachev pulls half his forces out, we could reduce our assistance by half; and so forth.

At the same time Soviet military aid to the Kabul regime would have to be phased down as well. This would guarantee that at no point would the military balance in the field shift in favor of the Soviet Union and its communist clients. Therefore, at no time would our friends in the Afghan resistance become any more vulnerable than they are today.

There has been some discussion in the press to the effect that the United States may have committed itself in 1985 to an early aid cutoff. I believe you, Mr. Chairman, alluded to that in your opening remarks. But any implied commitment was made in the context of an overall proposal by our side with a withdrawal timetable of three months. That is an important point.

Accordingly, if Moscow insists that we stick to this past implied commitment, we can simply respond by saying,

1 fine, we'll cut off the supply effort entirely when only  
2 three months remain in the withdrawal period.

3 This is perfectly consistent with our previous commit-  
4 ment. Let me just make that clear. Since we made the initial  
5 statement that we may be willing to cut off aid upon the  
6 withdrawal of Soviet forces, and we expected that withdrawal  
7 to take place within three months, we were willing to cut  
8 off that aid at the beginning of three months' period. It  
9 follows quite logically that we could say that we'll terminate  
10 all our aid to the Afghan resistance three months prior to  
11 the conclusion of the entire Soviet withdrawal.

12 This would be quite consistent with our position. And  
13 yet would meet the new situation which has arisen in the  
14 light of the expected longer duration for the Soviet withdraw-  
15 al.

16 Furthermore, any undertaking of this sort should be part  
17 of a reciprocal prohibition on the provision of military  
18 support by either side to its respective friends in Afghani-  
19 stan after the Soviet withdrawal.

20 Neither the Afghan communists nor the Afghan resistance  
21 should receive arms or ammunition or other military support  
22 after the Soviet Union's forces have departed.

23 Secondly, we cannot accept any settlement that would  
24 have the effect of dismantling the present infrastructure for  
25 assisting the Afghan resistance. This, too, is quite



important.

Gorbachev's proposal calls for a two months' gap between the signing of a settlement and the start of the pullout. On January 11th, Pravda commented quite authoritatively, "The two-month gap is no random figure. It is conditioned by the need to allow Islamabad time to remove the rebel bases in Pakistani territory. In short, the problem has to do not with the date when the Soviet troop withdrawal begins, but the date when U.S. aid to the rebels ends."

If that observation represents Soviet intentions, we must not play into their hands. We should not accept any settlement that dismantles our assistance infrastructure, and that thereby precludes the possibility of restarting our aid in the event that Moscow violates the agreement.

The second major outstanding issue in the proximity talks is the question of a transition government. Gorbachev has declared his opposition to changing the leadership in Kabul. Pakistan has demanded that the UN-sponsored settlement be signed with a transition regime, not with the current Kabul government. China has chided Gorbachev for ruling out the possibility of a transition government. Most resistance leaders also wish to see some kind of a transition regime established.

As far as this issue is concerned, I'm aware of the

1 arguments in favor of demanding that a transition regime be  
2 established as part of a settlement. The often-cited danger  
3 is that signing with the Kabul regime would confer a measure of  
4 international legitimacy on Najibullah.

5 On the other hand, I'm also aware that negotiating a  
6 transition regime would take a long time, and would surely  
7 delay the initial starting point of a Soviet withdrawal,  
8 beyond May 15th.

9 Given these considerations, I lean toward the view  
10 favoring the separation of an agreement on the specific  
11 military arrangements for a withdrawal from any considerations  
12 of the political aftermath in the wake of a Soviet pullout.

13 In other words, concluding a technical agreement on the  
14 Soviet departure with whoever operates currently in Kabul as  
15 the alleged government need not imply a closer political  
16 relationship to this would-be regime than the one we have  
17 today.

18 We could certainly clarify that fact in a political  
19 statement issued coincidentally with the conclusion of an  
20 agreement. If the agreement provides for a proportional and  
21 reciprocal phase-out of military assistance, the emergence of  
22 an authentic Afghan government after the Soviet withdrawal  
23 would then be up to the Afghan people themselves.

24 It might, or it might not, involve the appearance of a  
25 transition regime arranged among the Afghans. It could well

1 involve a brief period of armed struggle, as a result of  
2 which the Mujahideen assume power directly.

3       It is not likely than the Najibullah regime could  
4 survive on its own for more than a brief period. The  
5 Mujahideen have indicated that they will be magnanimous  
6 toward the remnants of the Najibullah government. And we  
7 could encourage and support such magnanimity. No one has an  
8 interest in continuing the bloodshed for what would be a  
9 protracted negotiation over the membership and nature of a  
10 transition regime.

11       Nor do we have an interest in becoming mired in complex  
12 negotiations that would almost certainly lead to serious  
13 disputes between the resistance and the United States, or  
14 between the United States and Pakistan.

15       It could therefore well be best to separate the military  
16 aspects of the projected Soviet departure from the political  
17 arrangements that would emerge in its aftermath.

18       Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19       [Statement follows:]

20

p. 14

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN

February 18, 1988

Zbigniew Brzezinski

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you the current situation in the war for Afghanistan and the implications for the war of the recent diplomatic moves that have taken place in the run up to the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva in early March.

In my testimony today, I do not wish to prejudge the sincerity of the recent statement made by General Secretary Gorbachev. I have consistently argued that if the United States and the other supporters of the Afghan resistance continued to raise the military and political costs of the war to Moscow the point would come when the Kremlin might choose to disengage. We may have reached that point, though uncertainties remain. In his speech, Gorbachev made some important, initial concessions. We need to seek further changes, but I do believe that his proposal can be used as the partial point of departure for further negotiation.

Our goal must be a settlement that involves a withdrawal of the Soviet Union's occupation army and that secures the right of self-determination of the Afghan people. Such a settlement is in the interest of the Afghan people and in the interest of those countries which have a strategic stake in Afghanistan. I believe we should do what we can to advance that goal through the proximity talks, but without engaging in wishful thinking or

ignoring the very real differences that continue to divide the two sides. It is to those outstanding issues that I will focus my remarks.

Before taking up these issues, I wish to make one more general point: As we move to take advantage of Gorbachev's new proposal, we must not foreclose the possibility that through these moves he seeks to attain at the negotiating table what he has failed to achieve on the battlefield. It is conceivable that Gorbachev is trying to transform his problem in Afghanistan into our problem. He might be trying to shift attention away from the question of the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and toward negotiating a complicated structure that would legitimize Moscow's present determinant in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and that would enable his military forces to leave while Moscow retains political control and while the talks precipitate a split between us and the resistance. In this regard, a recent book edited by Rosanne Klass at Freedom House, Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited, offers some persuasive evidence to the effect that the talks in Geneva might be but a gambit in a larger strategy to prevail in Afghanistan. Thus, while we should proceed with the talks, we must not let that happen.

\* \* \*

It seems to me that there are two critical issues that still need to be addressed in the proximity talks. The first is the Soviet withdrawal timetable and the termination of outside aid to the resistance. The second is the question of whether an accord is to be signed with the current Kabul regime or with some kind of a transition government.

As far as the first issue is concerned, the current Soviet proposal calls for a 10-month withdrawal in which 50 percent of Soviet forces leave within the first 3 months and during which Soviet forces would be prohibited from undertaking offensive actions. Furthermore, it calls for a cutoff of outside aid to the Afghan resistance at the start of the Soviet withdrawal. All of this, under his proposal, would be agreed upon by March 15 and the aid cutoff and the withdrawal would begin on May 15.

It is my view that if we are to accept the 10-month timetable, we should insist on two changes in Gorbachev's proposed formula:

(1) We cannot accept the stipulation that terminates our assistance to the Afghans at the start of the Soviet withdrawal. We should call for a phase out, not a cutoff, of our aid. I would favor an offer to reduce our aid in direct proportion to the reductions of Soviet manpower in Afghanistan. If Gorbachev pulls half his forces out, we could reduce our assistance by half, and so forth. At the same time, Soviet military aid to the Kabul regime would have to be phased down as well. This would guarantee that at no point would the military balance in the field shift in favor of the Soviet Union and its communist clients. Therefore, at no time would our friends in the Afghan resistance become any more vulnerable than they are today.

There has been some discussion in the press to the effect that the United States may have committed itself in 1985 to an early aid cutoff. But any implied commitment was made in the context of an overall proposal with a withdrawal timetable of

three months. Accordingly, if Moscow insists that we stick to this past statement, we can simply respond by saying, "Fine, we will cut off the supply effort when only three months remain in the withdrawal period. This is perfectly consistent with our previous commitment." Furthermore, any undertaking of this sort should be part of a reciprocal prohibition on the provision of military support by either side to its respective friends in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Neither the Afghan communists nor the Afghan resistance should receive arms, ammunition, or other military support after the Soviet Union's forces have departed.

(2) We cannot accept any settlement that would have the effect of dismantling the present infrastructure for assisting the Afghan resistance. Gorbachev's proposal calls for a two-month gap between the signing of a settlement and the start of a pullout. On January 11, a writer in Pravda commented, "The two-month gap is no random figure: it is conditioned by the need to allow Islamabad time to remove the rebel bases in Pakistani territory. In short, the problem has to do not with the date when the Soviet troop withdrawal begins but the date when U.S. aid to the rebels ends." If that observation represents Soviet intentions, we must not play into their hand. We should not accept any settlement that dismantles our assistance infrastructure and that thereby precludes the possibility of restarting our aid in the event that Moscow violates the agreement.

\* \* \*

The second major outstanding issue in the proximity talks is the question of a transition government. Gorbachev has declared

his opposition to changing the leadership in Kabul. Pakistan has demanded that the U.N.-sponsored settlement be signed with a transition regime, not with the current Kabul government. China has chided Gorbachev for ruling out the possibility of transition government. Most resistance leaders also wish to see some kind of a transition regime established.

As far as this issue is concerned, I am aware of the arguments in favor of demanding that a transition regime be established as part of a settlement. The often-cited danger is that signing with the Kabul regime would confer a measure of international legitimacy on Najibullah. On the other hand, I am also aware that negotiating a transition regime would take a long time and would surely delay the initial starting point of a Soviet withdrawal beyond May 15.

Given these considerations, I lean toward the view favoring the separation of an agreement on the specific military arrangements for a withdrawal from any considerations of the political aftermath in the wake of Soviet pullout. In other words, concluding a technical agreement on the Soviet departure with whoever operates in Kabul as the alleged government need not imply a closer political relationship to this would-be regime than the one we have today. We could certainly clarify that fact in a political statement issued coincidentally with the conclusion of an agreement.

If the agreement provides for a proportional and reciprocal phase out of military assistance, the emergence of an authentic Afghan government after the Soviet withdrawal would then be up to



the Afghan people themselves. It might, or might not, involve the appearance of a transition regime arranged among the Afghans. It could well involve a brief period of armed struggle as a result of which the mujahideen assume power directly. It is not likely that the Najibullah regime could survive on its own for more than a brief period. The mujahideen have indicated that they will be magnanimous toward the remnants of the Najibullah government, and we could encourage and support such magnanimity. No one has an interest in continuing the bloodshed for what would be a protracted negotiation over the membership and nature of a transition regime. Nor do we have an interest in becoming mired in complex negotiations that would almost certainly lead to serious disputes between the resistance and the United States. It therefore could well be best to separate the military aspects of the projected Soviet departure from the political arrangements that would emerge in its aftermath.

\*\*\*

1 Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Doctor, for an excellent  
2 and insightful statement.

3 Before we begin questions, I want to turn to Congressman  
4 Wilson first for any opening statement he wishes to make.

5 Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I cannot resist.

6 Senator Humphrey. We know.

7 Mr. Wilson. Dr. Brzezinski, I just the night before  
8 last got back from Pakistan, and have a headache from  
9 thinking more than I'm being accustomed to being forced to  
10 do, in discussing all of these problems.

11 But I'm not going to take--everybody wants to ask  
12 questions; I am not going to ask questions. But since I have  
13 been back, last night, as you know, the foreign minister is  
14 here, and there was a little reception at the Pakistani  
15 Embassy, and there were reporters there, and people from the  
16 State Department and all. It's just very intense, the  
17 discussion.

18 But I think something that all of us are really inter-  
19 ested in, I think you have exactly described the two points,  
20 which are, what kind of government are we going to deal with,  
21 and how is the arms cutoff going to be arranged.

22 And certainly we all share the view that the UN 1985  
23 agreement is asymmetrical and unacceptable.

24 I just want to frame something for the Committee here as  
25 we start, and that is, who in the United States signed such

1 an agreement? And where is the agreement that they signed?

2 Now, there are all kinds of different answers to that  
3 question. And is there actually an agreement, or is there  
4 not an agreement? And did the United States make an offer,  
5 or did it not make an offer?

6 If it did make an offer, the offer is unacceptable to  
7 this panel and to you. But if it did, or if there's an  
8 agreement, who did it and who knew about it? And is it still  
9 in force? And is the United States committed to it?

10 Those are the questions that I think are the most  
11 serious at this particular time. I don't think there is an  
12 disagreement about the unacceptability of the alleged  
13 agreement. The question is, is there an alleged agreement?

14 And if there is, who is responsible for alleging it to  
15 us.

16 Senator Humphrey. Congressman Ritter for an opening  
17 statement.

18 Mr. Ritter. Mr. Chairman, I simply wish to thank you  
19 for your leadership in holding these hearings. I regret I  
20 have missed the statement of the distinguished Dr. Brzezinski,  
21 and I look forward to other testimony.

22 I might just say one thing. I read through Gorbachev's  
23 speech last night. And there seems to be so many potential  
24 loopholes that we need to be careful with.

My own feeling is to proceed with great caution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. Doctor, you say that our goal must be a settlement that involves withdrawal of the Soviets' occupation army and secures the right of self determination.

In your view, do the agreements as now constituted secure the right of self determination for the Afghan people?

Dr. Brzezinski. The agreement doesn't yet exist. It's taking shape. I think the most important issues are still to be resolved. I believe that I have identified, and you agree, the most important issues. Until these issues are resolved, I think the most important aspects have not been taken care of.

We are often told, when there is a negotiating process, that 90 percent of the agreement is in shape; only 10 percent remains. But usually it is the most important 10 percent that determines the substance of the agreement. And I would say that is the case today.

However, if the Soviets do leave, I would consider that to be the creation of a situation in which the Afghan people are in a position to determine their own future, and therefore, to exercise self-determination.

I do consider it most important to create conditions for the propitious departure of Soviet forces. And therefore, on balance--and that pertains to the second issue that I was raising--I lean to the conclusion that some

1 delinking of the technical aspects of the  
2 arrangements for the departure of Soviet forces should be  
3 separate from whatever political consequences that departure  
4 engenders.

5 Senator Humphrey. That however does not comment on a  
6 third important element which you have raised in your  
7 statement, and that is, the essentiality of ensuring that the  
8 Soviets are not free to resupply their own troops while they  
9 still remain, and likewise, that of the puppet army.

10 Dr. Brzezinski. That is correct. And I think that of  
11 course has to be part of the military understanding.

12 I deliberately like to differentiate between that  
13 part of an agreement which I consider to be technical -  
14 military, and that part of the agreement which has political  
15 implications.

16 With regard to the former, I think it is very appropriate  
17 to insist that any termination on a phase-out basis of our  
18 assistance to the Mujahideen be fully reciprocated by the  
19 Soviet side, which means not only the withdrawal of Soviet  
20 forces, but the termination of substantial Soviet aid to its  
21 puppets.

22 At the same time, I do have to add, as an aside, that I  
23 do consider the withdrawal of Soviet forces infinitely more  
24 important. Because if the Soviets choose to provide equipment  
25 to their clients in Kabul, that equipment will be very

1 helpful in creating an independent Mujahideen army, since  
2 there is no doubt that equipment will end up eventually in  
3 the hands of the Mujahideen.

4 Senator Humphrey. Once again, with respect to securing  
5 the right of self determination, how essential is it that  
6 that final 10 percent, as you put it, or the final agreement,  
7 require that Soviet aid to the PDPA regime be fully and  
8 completely terminated, as will outside aid to the Mujahideen?

9 Dr. Brzezinski. In the technical-military aspects that  
10 we will be dealing with in the context of the agreement,  
11 obviously, the goal is to terminate a Soviet presence and  
12 to minimize the likelihood of protracted fighting in the wake  
13 of the Soviet departure.

14 Therefore, insisting on the proposition that Soviet  
15 military aid to its clients has to be  
16 terminated is very appropriate.

17 However, as I said a minute ago, between these two  
18 aspects, Soviet departure and Soviet military aid to their  
19 clients, the former is far more important than the latter.  
20 Because the former will have decisive consequences on the  
21 ground.

22 The latter, I suspect, could prolong the struggle. But  
23 in the end, whatever equipment the Soviets choose to give to  
24 their puppets probably will end up in the hands of the  
25 freedom fighters.

1        Senator Humphrey. I would say that that is not a closed  
2 question. It depends on how effective continued Soviet  
3 influence, if any, is.

4        In your remarks you talk about the need to ensure that  
5 we don't take apart the infrastructure through which outside  
6 assistance to the Mujahideen passes.

7        Let's take the worst-case scenario. Let's examine the  
8 possibility that the Soviets are insincere in this, and that  
9 this is just a new ploy, and that they hope to provoke a  
10 cutoff of outside assistance, and then remain somehow,  
11 somewhere, in Afghanistan, either with respect to territory  
12 or influence or both.

13        Would it be possible for the United States, in your  
14 opinion, to effectively resume aid to the Mujahideen under  
15 that circumstance?

16        Dr. Brzezinski. I think you have raised a very important  
17 point to which insufficient attention has been given. We  
18 don't even have to assume Soviet insincerity to be concerned  
19 over that point.

20        We can even assume Soviet sincerity at this stage. But  
21 even then we cannot exclude the possibility that something  
22 breaks down, and the Soviets simply reverse course, halt  
23 their withdrawal, or replenish their forces in Afghanistan.

24        Where are we then if in the meantime we have  
25 dismantled the entire infrastructure of support? We would

1 have to start again from ground zero. And it took a long  
2 time in the development of that support.

3 Senator Humphrey. Years.

4 Dr. Brzezinski. I was deeply involved in negotiating  
5 and arranging the initial first two years of that response.  
6 And it took a lot of work.

7 Then gradually it developed momentum, and it is now an  
8 impressive structure. If we dismantle it, we will be at a  
9 great disadvantage. And therefore I think it is terribly  
10 important that our negotiators, our indirect negotiators, and  
11 particularly, those of our policymakers who will be dealing  
12 with the Soviets directly in the context of START not  
13 tempted to give away too much on this issue.

14 Because I think if we do that, we will be in fact  
15 reducing the likelihood of a positive outcome to this  
16 conflict, and creating openings for a change in Soviet  
17 policy, even if the Soviets currently may be sincere about  
18 terminating their presence.

19 Senator Humphrey. One last question. I'm intruding on  
20 the time of my colleagues, I'm afraid, but I do want to  
21 follow up.

22 Apart from the United States' involvement, in the  
23 context of Pakistan's political climate, do you suppose it  
24 would be possible for Pakistan to resume its role in support-  
25 ing the Afghan resistance of the situation in Afghanistan



1 deteriorated, either through Soviet deceit or just a change  
2 of circumstances?

3 Dr. Brzezinski. I think given the internal conditions  
4 in Afghanistan, and a certain fatigue with the refugees and  
5 all of that--

6 Senator Humphrey. You mean in Pakistan?

7 Dr. Brzezinski. In Pakistan. Didn't I say Pakistan?

8 Senator Humphrey. No, you said Afghanistan.

9 Dr. Brzezinski. Sorry, in Pakistan, it would certainly  
10 be considerably more difficult than was the case in '78 and  
11 '79. And I'm sure the Soviets are aware of it.

12 I do believe that one of the tactical Soviet objectives,  
13 without prejudging the question of overall sincerity and the  
14 desire to get out, is to stimulate conflicts between us and  
15 the Pakistanis.

16 I was rather unhappy--rather unhappy--to see in the  
17 press this morning references to comments by one of your  
18 colleagues regarding the Pakistanis and their somewhat divergent  
19 position from ours on the question of the transition regime.

20 As you can tell from my statement, I don't fully agree  
21 with the Pakistani position on the transitional regime. But  
22 the last thing we should be doing is, if we disagree with the  
23 Pakistanis, to start blaming them for obstructing a possible  
24 settlement. Because that is precisely what the Soviets want  
25 us to do, to disunite us from the Pakistanis.

1       Because once a crack appears, then the ability to  
2 sustain the Mujahideen resistance is severely compromised.

3       Senator Humphrey. Senator Hecht?

4       Senator Hecht. Thank you very much, doctor. I enjoyed  
5 your testimony.

6       The only question in my mind right now, having been in  
7 Pakistan twice in the last 18 months, and was one of the ones  
8 urging us to sell them Stinger missiles, I don't know what  
9 the great haste is in going to the negotiating table.

10       We are making a fantastic breakthrough. I was in  
11 eastern Europe after the Second World War and watched Russia  
12 move in on all these countries which are now Soviet-bloc  
13 countries. This is the first ray of hope.

14       I would be very reluctant to go to the negotiating table  
15 and negotiate what we won on the battlefield. And this is  
16 not just a communist idea to get a warm seat for it. Ivan I,  
17 Ivan III, Peter the Great have all had their minds on this.

18       I think that before we get to that negotiating table, we  
19 should be a little bit better prepared militarily. How do  
20 you feel about that?

21       Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I don't quite agree with you. I  
22 think that indeed we have been doing fine militarily; and  
23 when we say "we", we're in a way projecting our empathy,  
24 because it is the Afghans who are doing fine militarily, and  
25 they deserve the credit. They have been the courageous ones.

1 They have borne the real sacrifices.

2 But "we" in this larger collective sense have not been  
3 doing badly. I think that negotiating with the Soviets per  
4 se is not tantamount to giving things away. It depends on  
5 how you negotiate, and how well you stick to your positions,  
6 and how clearly and effectively you define them.

7 Therefore, I do not object to the process of  
8 negotiating with the Soviets. And if through a process of  
9 negotiating a military - technical arrangement we can in fact  
10 make it possible for them to leave sooner rather than later,  
11 I am all in favor of it.

12 My concern about the negotiations is that we may be too  
13 eager to cut an agreement, and thereby cut an agreement which  
14 makes it easier for the Soviets to stay. And that is where  
15 my concern is directed.

16 But I do not object to the negotiating process as such.

17 Senator Hecht. Well, my concerns are this. What are  
18 our positions? I'm not aware of what our positions are right  
19 now.

20 Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I think that there are U.S.  
21 positions on some issues which are perfectly acceptable; and  
22 there are U.S. positions on some issues which are ambiguous  
23 or undesirable.

24 When the invisible State Department official someday  
25 responds to you, he is in a better position to clarify the

...the situation of the ... government ...

...in the ... of the ... I ...  
...a ... of the ... of this ... I ...  
...is ... and I ... that ...  
...is ...

...we ... agreement ... a ...  
...of a ... placed ... the ...  
...is ...

...the ... of the ... we agree  
...the ... of the ...  
...the ... and ...  
...statement affirming our view that ...  
...that speak authoritatively for the ...  
...is ...

...the other hand ... if we agree to arrangements that  
...our ability to sustain our resistance ... that  
...the ... rights of the resistance ... that  
...is unacceptable.

I think it's in this area that our negotiators ought  
...to be pressed, and a clearer stand by the United States  
...caner

Senator Beck: Now, you mentioned a phase-down ...  
...can we verify that?

Dr. Brzezinski: Well, we can certainly verify Soviet  
...departure more easily, in fact, than they can verify our

...  
...  
...  
...

1 phase-down. So the problem is really for them; not for us.

2 Senator Hecht. Thank you. I am on a time frame, and I  
3 want to hear our next witness. So I am going to give up  
4 time, okay?

5 Senator Humphrey. Very well. Congressman McCollum?

6 Mr. McCollum. Thank you. Dr. Brzezinski, if we do  
7 follow the plan or the Soviets agree to it, and the government  
8 in Pakistan and everybody is involved in what you suggest  
9 here about the pullout and so on without a transitional  
10 government really being in place that involved the Mujahideen,  
11 what are the risks of there being a greater civil war and  
12 inter-fighting among the Mujahideen factions than there would  
13 be if we were able to have a transitional government under-  
14 stood in place at the time of the cutoff of aid and the  
15 pullout?

16 Dr. Brzezinski. You know, if you assume that there's  
17 going to be a major civil war among the Mujahideen factions  
18 after the Soviets leave, then what guarantee is there that  
19 there won't be such fighting if some artificial transitional  
20 regime is glued together before the Soviets leave?

21 I don't think there is any guarantee. The issue is that  
22 the Soviets constitute a foreign presence in Afghanistan and  
23 an effort to impose a communist government on the Afghan  
24 people who do not want it.

Once the Soviets are gone, it is up to the Afghans to

1 sort out their political problems themselves, peacefully  
2 preferably, or otherwise. But that is their problem. It's  
3 not our problem. It is not the Soviets' problem.

4 I am confident that whatever happens in Afghanistan  
5 after the Soviets have left will result in a government that  
6 will then be purely Afghan. And whether it's Islamic,  
7 fundamentalist, or whatever, is really not an issue for us to  
8 resolve.

9 Mr. McCollum. Well, Dr. Brzezinski, it seems to me  
10 that, based on their expressions to me personally, that is a  
11 problem to the Pakistanis. It's a problem in the sense that  
12 they perceive the onset of a civil war inside Afghanistan  
13 immediately after the Soviet withdrawal to be more refugees,  
14 to be more problems for them, to be politically disastrous.

15 And consequently, it seems to me they are going to be  
16 very unwilling to any agreement that does not involve  
17 something that at least on the surface appears to them to  
18 have a chance of succeeding.

19 And therein lies much of the problem with regard to  
20 their positioning on this matter.

21 Do you perceive the same thing I do in that regard?

22 Dr. Brzezinski. Well, as I indicated in my statement,  
23 there are serious and complicated issues involved here, which  
24 have to be discussed very responsibly and nonacrimoniously  
25 with the Pakistanis.

1           Nonetheless, my view is that if we ourselves now become  
2 embroiled in trying to shape a transitional government, we  
3 are likely to get bogged down in very difficult, complicated  
4 negotiations among Afghan groups which we'll have to be  
5 sponsoring; and which, if they fail, will make it easier for  
6 the Soviets to say, well, you see, we cannot leave, because  
7 if we leave, there's going to be a brutal civil war.

8           I think the position that you have articulated runs the  
9 risk of them being exploited by the Soviets to justify a  
10 continued presence. Because it creates the impression that  
11 somehow or other Soviet aggression against the Afghan people  
12 is a lesser evil than the possibility of some civil strife  
13 among some independent Afghan groups.

14           I do not accept that proposition. Even if somebody  
15 accepts the notion that there will be some fighting among the  
16 Afghans, I consider that to be a lesser evil than the Soviet  
17 presence.

18           And therefore, it is the Soviet presence that must be  
19 terminated.

20           Mr. McCollum. But if we don't have a common understand-  
21 ing, at least among the groups and the Paki's and us, at the  
22 time of this withdrawal, and we do have some strife immediate-  
23 ly occurring after that, isn't it likely the Soviets might  
24 see that as a pretext to reenter?

1 Afghan groups are in some degree in conflict against each  
2 other, they're likely then to coalesce and oppose the  
3 Soviets. And if we are in a position to give them support,  
4 the Soviets will be back where they are right now.

5 I fear that if we get involved in the process of trying  
6 to contrive some sort of political arrangement of Afghanistan--  
7 on the contrivance of which Soviet departure is conditioned --  
8 we will make it easier for the Soviets to stay later and to  
9 blame us and the Pakistanis and the Mujahideen for their  
10 continued presence, which is exactly what some Soviet leaders  
11 may be calculating.

12 So my judgment is that we would be falling into a very  
13 major political trap if we ourselves link Soviet departure to  
14 the creation of a transitional regime. I think we ought to  
15 keep the two apart, let the Soviets leave, and then it is up  
16 to the Afghans to sort out their politics themselves.

17 Mr. McCollum. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you,  
18 Mr. Chairman.

19 Senator Humphrey. Congressman Wilson?

20 Mr. Wilson. Dr. Brzezinski, as usual, I agree with you  
21 totally. I believe that trying to put an interim government  
22 in place is impossible. Really, it's desirable but it's  
23 impossible.

24 The Afghans and the Pakistanis look at sitting down with  
25 Najibullah much as a rabbi would look at sitting down with



1 Hitler to work out something. It just can't be done. There  
2 was just too much history.

3 And I also agree with you about the most important thing  
4 being the arms arrangement.

5 And I want to ask you now, and if you want to say that  
6 it is just clumsy to discuss or whatever, well, just say it.  
7 Otherwise, let us directly address ourselves.

8 Now, you followed things very closely. You have been  
9 the national security adviser to the President of the United  
10 States. Who signed the agreement?

11 Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I honestly do not know. I have  
12 been told--

13 Mr Wilson. Who do you have a suspicion may have signed  
14 the agreement? Because I am not being really silly. I  
15 really am pursuing this with some diligence. I want to know  
16 who signed the damn paper.

17 Dr. Brzezinski. Well, as you know, in recent years the  
18 policy-making processes involving the National Security  
19 Council and the Department of State have not been the most  
20 precise or efficient.

21 Mr. Wilson. Yes, but somebody had to sign the paper.

22 Dr. Brzezinski. Therefore, I understand that there was  
23 a piece of paper that flowed somehow from the innards of the  
24 State Department to the NSC, was approved on the NSC staff  
25 level, and then floated back to the Department of State.

1 Now, that is hearsay from my various friends in the adminis-  
2 tration with whom I occasionally ruminate on the state of the  
3 world. But it is not authoritative, and you Congressmen have  
4 access to the authoritative people who can give you a  
5 response.

6 I would suggest you write a letter to the Secretary and  
7 ask him. Did he sign such a piece of paper? Did he authorize  
8 a piece of paper to be presented by the Pakistanis? Did he  
9 send a piece of paper over to the NSC for approval? Who  
10 signed off on it?

11 I have read in the press, as you have, that the President  
12 was somewhat above such tactical minutiae, and, therefore,  
13 was not brought into the picture.

14 Mr. Wilson. Well, the best I have been able to get is  
15 the guy who probably signed it died.

16 Dr. Brzezinski. Yes. But do not link the two.

17 Mr. Wilson. Pardon?

18 Dr. Brzezinski. Do not link the two.

19 Mr. Wilson. No, no. But the fellow who probably signed  
20 it is not here to say whether he signed it.

21 Dr. Brzezinski. That is right.

22 Mr. Wilson. But I still think that somebody has it in  
23 their safe somewhere. I am curious.

24 Dr. Brzezinski. But do remember this, and I think it is  
25 an important point to stress. Instead of making this

1 into a witch hunt against the Department of State or denigrat-  
2 ing it, let us take the following position which I think is  
3 legitimate, proper, and gives everybody a decent way out:

4       Whoever approved that did so with good intentions and in  
5 the context of the notion that the Soviet withdrawal will  
6 last three months; and that, therefore, three months prior to  
7 the conclusion of that withdrawal,                               we would  
8 be justified in cutting off aid to the Mujahideen, especially  
9 since the flow through the pipeline will continue for X  
10 number of weeks--and I do not want to be precise in that--  
11 simply given its dynamic.

12       Therefore, the proposal that we made or the implied  
13 commitment we undertook involved the notion that our cutoff  
14 would be followed by a total elimination of the Soviet  
15 presence in Afghanistan within three months. If we now reach  
16 a compromise with the Soviets providing for nine months  
17 withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, I think we  
18 could legitimately take the view that our aid flow to the  
19 Mujahideen would be totally terminated at the conclusion of  
20 the first six months, or three months prior to the final  
21 elimination of Soviet presence.

22       Mr. Wilson. I agree with you. But the problem is that  
23 in that news story you referenced yesterday in Mr. Solarz's  
24 subcommittee, the thrust of the conversation, particularly  
25 with Mr. Harrison, was that the United States had not acted

1 in good faith on its 1985 agreement, and that Pakistan was in  
2 cahoots, and that by not acting in good faith on our 1985  
3 agreement we were responsible for not having peace and total  
4 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

5 And that is why it is so important to know if there was  
6 an agreement; and if there was, then somebody should be able  
7 to defend it on the very grounds that you defended it, for  
8 instance. That is the first time I have ever heard that  
9 three-month scenario, which I think, of course, is good. But  
10 that is not written down anywhere.

11 Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I believe that the record will  
12 show--and here, again, I am talking with thirdhand knowledge--  
13 --that we were talking at the time of a three-month timetable  
14 for the Soviet withdrawal.

15 Mr. Wilson. But should there not be somebody in the  
16 administration that could tell us that?

17 Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I agree with you. There should  
18 be. But I am trying to be helpful, and rather than to  
19 contribute to a confrontation, I am trying to find a decent  
20 way out which is, I think, sensible and, in fact, legitimate  
21 even vis-a-vis the Soviets.

22 I do not particularly care what some witnesses say about  
23 welshing out to the Soviets.

24 Mr. Wilson. They were not just witnesses. They were  
25 colleagues.

1 Dr. Brzezinski. They were overly preoccupied with  
2 getting a prompt settlement. But the point is that I think  
3 there is legitimacy to the solution that I am advocating;  
4 namely, yes, we made that statement in good faith. We are  
5 prepared to terminate our assistance to the Mujahideen, but  
6 the question is when. And our view always has been three  
7 months prior to the completion of the Soviet withdrawal. If  
8 we now agree on nine months, it follows it is at the end of  
9 the six months. If we agree on ten months, it is at the end  
10 of seven months. It is still the same deal that we were  
11 willing to accept three years ago, and, therefore, we are not  
12 welshing on it.

13 Mr. Wilson. It is my understanding that the Soviets say  
14 what we do with the government in Afghanistan has absolutely  
15 nothing to do with this United Nations agreement that both of  
16 us have agreed to in 1985.

17 I thank the Chairman.

18 Senator Humphrey. Congressman Ritter.

19 Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 Dr. Brzezinski, I want to personally thank you for  
21 developing, initiating a program of assistance to the Afghan  
22 freedom fighters. I think everybody in this room, in this  
23 country, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan should understand  
24 who the architect, the original architect of the assistance  
25 to the freedom fighters was. You certainly deserve that

1 recognition, sir.

2 Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you.

3 Mr. Ritter. Let me ask you a question. When the  
4 Soviets pull out, where do they go?

5 Dr. Brzezinski. You mean the military forces?

6 Mr. Ritter. Yes. The forces and the equipment.

7 Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I assume they will go to central  
8 Asia. Some probably will be simply disbanded. The Soviets  
9 have been rotating forces, so there is not really one primary  
10 source of origin for the units that are currently in Af-  
11 ghanistan.

12 Mr. Ritter. My question is: Do they go to a place and  
13 are they mobilized to an extent in that place that it is  
14 simply a matter of a few miles or a few tens of miles or a  
15 hundred miles before they are back inside the country? I  
16 refer to the history in Vietnam when Le Duc Tho and Kissinger  
17 won Nobel Peace Prizes for an agreement that pulled out some  
18 North Vietnamese troops. But they came back in as soon as  
19 the agreement was signed. They began to infiltrate back into  
20 South Vietnam.

21 How does this situation compare?

22 Dr. Brzezinski. I understand the thrust of your point.  
23 The Soviets have built up a logistical infrastructure just  
24 across the Afghan frontier. Therefore, it is quite clear  
25 that even upon the completion of a Soviet withdrawal from

1 Afghanistan, the Soviets will retain the capacity for very  
2 prompt reentry. And that inherently involves a very basic  
3 asymmetry between them and us.

4 Mr. Ritter. This is very bothering--

5 Dr. Brzezinski. In response to can they go back in--

6 Mr. Ritter. This is very disturbing. In other words,  
7 your point about retaining the infrastructure of aid becomes  
8 really essential, because they can pop back in at any time.  
9 And if we have destroyed the pipeline, so to speak, and we  
10 cannot pump the oil, so to speak, where would we be?

11 I note in Gorbachev's speech he talks about "If, however,  
12 they are guided not by the arguments of reason but by  
13 emotions multiplied by fanaticism, then they would confronted  
14 with the greatly increased will of the Afghan people to see  
15 their country pacified."

16 I would hope our negotiators are very much concerned  
17 about this.

18 I would like to switch. Do you have any more comment on  
19 that?

20 Dr. Brzezinski. I would have just one comment on this  
21 issue because it is an important one. Now, obviously, we  
22 want the Soviets to withdraw. Obviously, we cannot get the  
23 Soviets to, let us say, neutralize or demilitarize portions  
24 of the Soviet Union next to Afghanistan. So they will always  
25 have a considerable logistical, geographical advantage if

1 they should decide to go back in again.

2 That, I think, raises a longer range geostrategic issue  
3 for us, which we should not be neglecting; namely, that even  
4 if the Soviets leave Afghanistan and the war is terminated,  
5 it will remain very much in the American interest to sustain  
6 and to nurture a good relationship with Pakistan.

7 I think there is going to be a temptation, particularly  
8 in Congress, to focus then on other more contentious issues in  
9 the American-Pakistani relationship, or to pursue a flirtation  
10 with India at the cost of the American-Pakistani relationship.  
11 I think we ought to bear in mind the fact that a good  
12 relationship with Pakistan is the most important guarantee  
13 against a Soviet reentry into Afghanistan.

14 Mr. Ritter. Sir, I would like to underpin a point made  
15 by my colleague from Texas when he talked about the beginnings  
16 of a kind of new political debate. Somehow over this  
17 agreement, the United States may not live up to its obliga-  
18 tions, and the wonderful bipartisan, unanimous support that  
19 we have had for assisting the freedom fighters might start to  
20 dissolve, given the presidential political climate, given  
21 glasnost. In the atmosphere of glasnost, we cut off aid to  
22 freedom fighters in Nicaragua.

23 I would like to ask you what your view of the possible  
24 political undermining could be, especially in Congress. And  
25 I would like to point out that there is a trip that is being



1 planned. I was invited to go on this trip yesterday, and I  
2 am considering it. It is arranged by a group called the  
3 International Center for Development Studies. I am not  
4 really familiar with this, but I noticed the names of former  
5 Ambassador Robert White, our Ambassador to El Salvador--whom  
6 you know well--who was an almost violent critic of the  
7 administration's policy in Central America. I notice on the  
8 list Colonel Edward King, former U.S. Army officer who has  
9 taken basically left-wing organizations on trips, with other  
10 members. I was on a trip with Colonel King. He is a very  
11 fine gentleman. He is also a serious opponent of the U.S.  
12 policy in Central America and has been a very effective  
13 critic against assisting either, frankly, the Nicaraguan  
14 contras or the government of El Salvador in terms of the  
15 military assistance program.

16 So I sense that on the horizon--Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.  
17 is going on this trip.

18 Dr. Brzezinski. Where is the trip going?

19 Mr. Ritter. Incidentally, it is going through Moscow.  
20 It is going to be arranged by the Soviets, and it is going to  
21 be going through Kabul as well. Eventually, I think they may  
22 get to speak with some of the resistance groups.

23 But it seems to me, with the kind of groups that I have  
24 traveled on to Central America, it seems to me that we may be  
25 facing a new political challenge over some of the issues

1 brought up by my colleague from Texas and brought up by the  
2 chairman of the Asia Subcommittee yesterday.

3 I would like your opinions on what advice you might have  
4 for us.

5 Dr. Brzezinski. Well, specifically with regard to the  
6 group and the trip, obviously one would need to know more  
7 about it. But I would think that it probably would not be a  
8 bad idea if several tough-minded people went on that trip and  
9 raised the kind of issues that need to be raised so it is not  
10 a one-sided show.

11 Mr. Ritter. My problem, sir, is I am already kind of  
12 committed to a Helsinki Commission trip going to the Soviet  
13 Union to look a little deeper into glasnost and the human  
14 rights perspectives. But I think you make a good point.  
15 That is why yesterday, as soon as I heard about it, I called  
16 my good friend, the chairman, and I called my good friend,  
17 the gentleman from Texas, to see if they might be willing to  
18 add some voices to this trip in some other part of the  
19 spectrum.

20 Dr. Brzezinski. But in any case, the larger issue, I  
21 think, that this initiative illustrates is that the Soviets  
22 are clearly trying to make, as I said earlier, their Afghan  
23 problem into our Afghan problem. That is the Soviet strategy.

24 Therefore, it is in our interest to cut apart surgically  
25 the military technical aspects of the issue; namely, the

1 Soviet military aggression and genocide against the Afghan  
2 people from the political problem of what sort of a government  
3 the Afghans themselves will set up. The Soviet tactic  
4 currently is to get us deeply embroiled into that issue.

5 I think the more we can keep them apart, the more  
6 effective we are in creating conditions for the termination  
7 of the Soviet presence, the better off everybody will be.

8 Mr. Ritter. Sir, I agree with you. I would like to  
9 close by saying that I am going to send a letter to President  
10 Reagan and hopefully get the support of some of my colleagues  
11 here and others in Congress to have you appointed as a  
12 special ambassador to help us solve the Afghan problem.

13 Thank you.

14 Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much.

15 Senator Humphrey. Finally, Doctor, if I may ask just  
16 one last question before we turn to our next witness, if you  
17 were advising the President, would you advise him to endorse  
18 an agreement that is less protective--this is the military  
19 end of it--less protective of the resistance than your  
20 proposal for a phasing down of assistance commensurate with  
21 the Soviet withdrawal?

22 Dr. Brzezinski. I want to be responsible in my answer  
23 because it is an important question you are asking.

24 I think what I have outlined is motivated by a re-  
25 sponsible concern for facilitating a Soviet departure, if the

1 Soviets are inclined to leave, without creating conditions  
2 prejudicial to the security of the Mujahideen or ones which  
3 might tempt the Soviets to reverse their departure.

4 I do not feel that everything I have said is set in  
5 concrete. There could be some adjustments here or there, but  
6 I think the basic proposition that I am making--namely, that  
7 we should not abandon the infrastructure at the early stages  
8 of the resolution of this conflict, if there is a resolution,  
9 that there should be a phase-down rather than a cutoff of  
10 aid--are valid and important points. And I do not think we  
11 should compromise on them because then we could even create a  
12 situation in which constructive Soviet intentions succumb to  
13 the temptation to reverse their withdrawal simply because  
14 there will be obvious openings and opportunities for such a  
15 reversal.

16 Senator Humphrey. In other words, in your view,  
17 anything less protective would be unacceptable.

18 Dr. Brzezinski. Than the general framework I have  
19 outlined, though I do not want to feel that I have locked  
20 myself into not accepting some adjustment here or there.

21 Senator Humphrey. Well, is it acceptable to cut off aid  
22 completely on the first day of Soviet withdrawal?

23 Dr. Brzezinski. Only if that withdrawal is completed  
24 within three months.

25 Senator Humphrey. You have got it pretty tightly closed

1 there.

2 Very well. Thank you, Doctor.

3 Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much.

4 Senator Humphrey. Excellent testimony. We very much  
5 appreciate your coming today.

6 Dr. Brzezinski. Good to be with you. And let me say  
7 that the work that you and your colleagues have done has been  
8 terribly important in focusing congressional attention on  
9 what is not only perhaps the most major human rights issue of  
10 our time, but obviously a vitally important geostrategic  
11 issue which goes beyond the specific importance of Afghanistan  
12 itself and has wider regional and international implications.

13 I was pleased to be able to testify.

14 Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

1        Senator Humphrey. Now, we will invite Ambassador  
2 Kirkpatrick to come to the stand--come to the table, I should  
3 say. Let us be informal and friendly about this.

4        Good morning and welcome, Madam Ambassador. We are glad  
5 to have you with us again before the Task Force. You are  
6 free to proceed as you wish.

1 STATEMENT OF JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, FORMER UNITED  
2 STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 1981-1985

3 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Senator Humphrey.

4 I would like to begin by thanking you for inviting me  
5 this morning to share with you some views I have on this very  
6 important subject.

7 Senator Humphrey. Would you pause just a moment and  
8 pull the microphone a little closer, please? Thank you.

9 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you very much for asking  
10 me to testify this morning. I welcome the opportunity to  
11 share my concerns with you and the other members of the Task  
12 Force.

13 I should like also to reiterate the view just expressed  
14 of Dr. Brzezinski that the work of the Task Force is impor-  
15 tant, has been important, and I think has made a major  
16 contribution and should continue to.

17 If I may, I will very briefly present some current  
18 preoccupations which I have about the current status of our  
19 situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's situation, I should  
20 say.

21 First, we are all aware of the agony of the Afghan  
22 people, the terrible, almost unthinkable cost to the Afghan  
23 people of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan,  
24 which is now in its eighth year; the four million Afghan  
25 refugees, the more than a million Afghan dead, the disruption

1 of Afghan life in all its aspects.

2 I would also remind the committee of the Soviet explana-  
3 tions for their decision to invade Afghanistan. First  
4 Secretary Brezhnev, then First Secretary Andropov have both  
5 described that decision as a lofty act of loyalty to the  
6 principle of proletarian internationalism necessary to defend  
7 the interests of our Motherland. First Secretary Gorbachev  
8 has recently restated in several public arenas his own view  
9 that the Soviet invasion and continued presence in Afghanistan  
10 was a direct consequence of both Soviet needs for self-  
11 defense and Afghan pleas for Soviet assistance. There has  
12 been no correction of the record, as it were, from the Soviet  
13 side about the reasons for the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

14 The current negotiations, the proximity talks, so-  
15 called, which have been under way for a number of years and  
16 which were, I might mention, under way during my years as  
17 U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, have, we  
18 all hear, reached a kind of a critical stage in which it is  
19 said that agreement is, indeed, very close at hand. And this  
20 is consistent with the repeated public statements, of course,  
21 of First Secretary Gorbachev and of his principal lieutenants  
22 of their desire to leave Afghanistan, the decision to leave  
23 Afghanistan. May I say that I believe that the Soviet  
24 government has, indeed, concluded that their continued  
25 military occupation of Afghanistan and war against the Afghan



1 people is profoundly counterproductive from their point of  
2 view.

3 It is interesting. The deployment of Soviet SS-20's  
4 against the capitals of Europe were taken in Europe as the  
5 most tangible symbol of an actual possibility of a Soviet  
6 attack on western Europe. And the Soviet invasion of  
7 Afghanistan was widely interpreted in the world--in Asia as  
8 well as in Europe and the Americas and in Africa--as a  
9 tangible and alarming symbol of Soviet expansionism in the  
10 world, of their willingness and readiness to use force in the  
11 course of the pursuit of an expansionist policy.

12 I believe that the new First Secretary of the Soviet  
13 Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, desires to eliminate both those  
14 symbols of Soviet aggressiveness in the world. I believe  
15 this has been a major impetus to the negotiation of an INF  
16 agreement which would remove and destroy Soviet intermediate  
17 range missiles. And I believe it is directly related to the  
18 Soviet stated intention to withdraw from Afghanistan.

19 In his book, Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev speaks about  
20 the barbaric mentality of Americans in emphasizing the  
21 existence of a Soviet threat to the security of other  
22 nations. And one of Premier Gorbachev's principal advisers  
23 on international affairs, Georgi Arbatov, commented semi-  
24 publicly during his visit with Gorbachev in the United States  
25 that they intended to "deprive the United States and the

1 West" of the idea of a Soviet threat. I believe that the  
2 withdrawal from Afghanistan, in their view, constitutes an  
3 important dimension of this refurbishing of the Soviet image  
4 worldwide. It obviously also would be very desirable from  
5 the point of view of the Afghan people, providing, of course,  
6 that the withdrawal was real and complete and came accompanied  
7 by the restoration of a government in Afghanistan based on  
8 self-determination and respect for Afghan independence.

9 We all know that rumors are rife in Washington concerning  
10 the status of that agreement and its various provisions. I  
11 have no special knowledge of the agreement nor its status.  
12 My understanding is very similar to that described by Dr.  
13 Brzezinski. It is that the Soviet Union proposes to provide  
14 within a nine-month framework for troop withdrawal, which is  
15 front-loaded, which would begin with the removal of perhaps  
16 50,000 Soviet troops, and a commitment that the remaining  
17 troops would undertake no offensive actions. My understanding  
18 is that in exchange for this, the United States is asked to  
19 cease all supply of the Mujahideen, and resupply, if you  
20 will, of the Mujahideen.

21 My understanding of the agreement and its terms does not  
22 include detailed knowledge about the removal of the remainder  
23 of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. My understanding is that  
24 the agreement contains no discussion of the composition of a  
25 subsequent government and leaves the implication that the

1 existing Afghan government would be a party to the agreement.  
2 I am not certain that this is accurate.

3 My understanding as well--and this is perhaps the most  
4 disturbing aspect of the agreement to me--is that there would  
5 be a U.S. commitment to begin the dismantling of the Muja-  
6 hideen bases concomitant to the cessation of U.S. supply and  
7 the beginning of Soviet withdrawal.

8 Now, if this gossip, these rumors concerning the  
9 agreement are reasonably accurate, then I would say there  
10 would be some very serious consequences of it. First, it  
11 would dramatically increase the pressure on both the Muja-  
12 hideen and on Pakistan, the government of Pakistan, to settle  
13 for almost anything or engage in a suicidal struggle. I have  
14 heard that the United Nations, through its World Food Program  
15 and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, has  
16 already significantly slowed the flow of basic foodstuffs and  
17 kerosene and tents to the Afghan refugees, leaving them with  
18 less a backlog than, for example, the Soviet-back Afghan  
19 forces, which I understand have been heavily resupplied and  
20 who, I am told, possess today a substantial backlog of both  
21 military supplies and basic requirements of subsistence.

22 Second, if such an agreement were to adopted in its  
23 current form, then my view is that it would dramatically  
24 complicate the problems of the government of Pakistan,  
25 increase pressure on them, encourage destabilization of

1 Pakistan through the flow of refugees into the cities in  
2 search of work and food for their families and themselves.

3 It is not necessary to emphasize to this Task Force the  
4 importance of Pakistan, the strategic importance of Pakistan  
5 to the whole Eurasian and Southwest Asian land mass.

6 The agreement comes at a time when Pakistan is already  
7 under significant pressure from the government of India and  
8 from the Soviet Union, and would, I think, lead to substantial  
9 demoralization in Pakistan as well as in the United States.  
10 I cannot resist saying that there is no prouder accomplishment  
11 of the President and the Reagan Administration than the  
12 restoration in the United States of a sense of solidarity, of  
13 American solidarity with the forces of freedom in the world.

14 I believe myself that the President's principal contribu-  
15 tion, perhaps, to our life and the freedom in the world is to  
16 have re-established the viability of freedom as an alternative  
17 future for mankind, demonstrating that it is not necessary  
18 for the countries of the world to slide or be pushed into a  
19 future of centralization, bureaucratization and tyranny.

20 I do not believe that the current rumors concerning the  
21 full contents of the agreement could be accurate, but I note  
22 I have more confidence in the administration than acceptance  
23 of the current rumors as accurate would permit me. I do note  
24 that the very existence of these rumors has a negative effect  
25 on the United States and on Pakistan and on the Afghan

1 freedom fighters.

2 I think a decent agreement, which I suppose we all  
3 desire, would have some different characteristics than those  
4 which are said to characterize the current agreement. First,  
5 I believe that a decent agreement would formally and ex-  
6 plicitly include representatives of the Mujahideen through  
7 the alliance in the negotiating process, just as the Central  
8 American peace accords included negotiations with the contras  
9 and the FNLN in El Salvador and other representatives of  
10 rebel groups in the peace talks.

11 If there is no elected government of Afghanistan--but  
12 certainly any reasonable appraisal would conclude that the  
13 alliance is the most plausible and credible representative of  
14 the Afghan people today. Indeed, they represent the whole  
15 Afghan people in exile which is more than a sample of the  
16 total population of Afghanistan.

17 Second, I believe the U.S. should take steps to guard  
18 the Mujahideen against pressures against their livelihood.  
19 The United States is the largest contributor to the United  
20 Nations High Commission on Refugees. We are the major  
21 contributors to the World Food Program. We are in a position  
22 to insist that supplies to the Afghan refugees not be  
23 diminished and that their livelihood not be forced to a  
24 dangerous edge.

25 Third, I believe that an adequate agreement would make

1 some provision for the repatriation of refugees in an orderly  
2 fashion, and I understand that the current agreement does  
3 not. Again, all my information about the current agreement  
4 may be mistaken. Frankly, I hope it is. But I am unaware of  
5 any provision for repatriation in the current agreement.

6 Finally, I think that an adequate agreement would  
7 include some further provisions. It would, for example,  
8 provide for a return of Afghan children who have been  
9 forcibly removed from their families for prolonged education  
10 in the Soviet Union. It would provide a different timetable  
11 for U.S. termination of assistance to the Mujahideen. I  
12 think it is entirely unreasonable to imagine or contemplate  
13 that U.S. assistance to the Mujahideen would end before the  
14 total withdrawal of Soviet forces. Proportionate phasing  
15 down of support with Soviet troop withdrawal is reasonable,  
16 providing, of course, that it is not accompanied by dis-  
17 mantling of the infrastructure and the bases of the Muja-  
18 hideen.

19 I note also that in the current form of rumors, there is  
20 no provision made for the dismantling of Soviet bases,  
21 forward air bases and other Soviet bases in Afghanistan. I  
22 should suppose that the dismantling of the Mujahideen's  
23 infrastructure would somehow be made proportionate to the  
24 total withdrawal of the Soviet infrastructure and destruction  
25 of the Soviet infrastructure.

1 I would note that in considering any U.S. commitment in  
2 any U.S. agreement of 1985, it is very important that the  
3 Task Force and all of us bear in mind that our Constitution  
4 provides for an orderly fashion for the making of commitments  
5 by the United States government. And, in fact, there is no  
6 lower level, even high level, lower level official of the  
7 United States government below the President, it seems to me,  
8 who is in a position to make an authoritative commitment on  
9 behalf of the United States.

10 Now, this is understood by the United Nations Secretary  
11 General and by other foreign governments with whom we deal.

12 So I would emphasize that it is disingenuous for anyone  
13 sophisticated enough to have followed the Afghan scene to  
14 pretend that they imagine that an informal and secret  
15 agreement initialled by an anonymous person is somehow  
16 binding on the United States government. This could not be  
17 the case. And anyone sophisticated enough to concern  
18 themselves with these affairs surely understands that. So I  
19 regard it as almost frivolous for any part of the government  
20 of the United States to speak and act as though any such  
21 informal anonymous initialling of a secret agreement could be  
22 binding on us.

23 Thank you very much.

24 Senator Humphrey. I hope you are right with respect to  
25 your characterization of this agreement. The problem is, as

1 you say, we are having to rely upon rumors--in fact I feel it  
2 is more than a rumor, we have it on the information of  
3 authoritative persons that this is far more than something  
4 insubstantial, this commitment the United States made.  
5 Nonetheless, as you and Dr. Brzezinski have pointed out,  
6 there are ample grounds upon which the Administration may  
7 insist upon modification of the agreements as they now stand,  
8 such that they are more decent, to use your term, or more  
9 protective of the resistance, as we see it.

10 Thank you for that excellent statement, Madam Ambassador.  
11 You ticked off five or six points which you think ought to be  
12 included in any decent agreement. I love that term--and  
13 that's exactly right: this is a matter of justice and  
14 decency, and it is well that you have used those terms.

15 If the present arrangements do not include these points,  
16 and particularly the major points--participation of the  
17 resistance in the talks that will determine the future of  
18 their country, protection for refugee livelihood: food and  
19 tents and medicine, orderly repatriation, return of Afghan  
20 children--I believe you are the first to raise that point.  
21 Talk about decency. How can we neglect to include that in  
22 formal agreements, the return of these children who essential-  
23 ly have been kidnapped to the Soviet Union. And, as you say,  
24 a different time table with regard to an reasonable end to  
25 the assistance to the resistance before a complete withdrawal.



1       Those are some of the points you raised that would  
2       constitute in your mind a decent agreement.

3       It looks to me, from all that I know--and I wish we had  
4       a witness from the State Department to verify exactly what we  
5       have committed to--but from all that we know, and certainly  
6       our knowledge is not insubstantial at this point, the  
7       agreements do not contemplate or embrace these points which  
8       you have raised. Therefore, if that is the case, are these  
9       indecent agreements as they now stand?

10       Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I would say that they are  
11       clearly incomplete and unacceptable agreements as the rumors  
12       suggest they now stand. Those rumors may not be accurate. I  
13       in fact do not believe that the Administration would agree to  
14       the proposals which are rumored to be on the verge of signing  
15       by the Secretary of State this month in Moscow. I find it  
16       impossible to believe that the Secretary of State would sign  
17       such an agreement.

18       May I say a word about the agreement? Since the  
19       presumed U.S. commitment of spring, I think, of 1985 coincided  
20       with the time when I was still a member of the Administration  
21       and serving as our representative at the United Nations, and  
22       also as a member of the President's not just cabinet but  
23       National Security Council and National Security Planning  
24       Group, which is a key decision body in the Administration, or  
25       at least was, I would like to emphasize that at no time did

1 the question of such an agreement or commitment by the United  
2 States come before the National Security Council or National  
3 Security Planning Group in the period that the commitment was  
4 presumably made.

5 I would also note that I was not informed, as the U.S.  
6 Permanent Representative at the United Nations, of the  
7 character of the commitment that was then being discussed and  
8 presumably made, and that I was disturbed by rumors around  
9 the United Nations at that time concerning possible U.S.  
10 initialling--is the way I heard the discussion--of a commit-  
11 ment to guarantee not just what we have discussed today--but  
12 actually to guarantee the persistence in Kabul of a government  
13 which would be friendly to the Soviet Union and acceptable to  
14 it in case of Soviet withdrawal. That rumor was then quite  
15 rife. These negotiations were conducted on the tightest  
16 possible basis at that time, and I do not believe were vetted  
17 at the highest policymaking levels of the Administration nor  
18 agreed to by the President.

19 Senator Humphrey. Well, before I turn to my colleagues,  
20 let me plead that you not be offended that you weren't  
21 informed because even the President wasn't informed.

22 And, by the way, this is not a new revelation. It was  
23 gone into at some length before a hearing of the House  
24 Foreign Relations Committee a good 18 months ago. And we  
25 know from current events of which you are a keen observer and

1 an active participant, that about a month ago, the President  
2 made a statement, a public statement to the effect that it  
3 would--I don't remember his words, but it would make no sense  
4 to cut off aid to the resistance at the outset of a Soviet  
5 withdrawal because that would leave them at the mercy of the  
6 puppet army still fully and continually resupplied.

7 Three or four days later, he had to make an about face  
8 when finally, apparently finally he was told what the State  
9 Department had obligated him to do without his knowledge,  
10 much less his approval, a few years earlier.

11 So the evidence is pretty strong.

12 Senator Hecht.

13 Senator Hecht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Ambassador, I enjoyed your statement very much. We're  
15 all banking on the sincerity of the Russians.

16 Now, I'm from Nevada. What do you feel the odds are that  
17 the Russians are really sincere?

18 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Well, I don't know. You'll  
19 have to tell me, Senator Hecht. 12

20 Senator Hecht. I have great doubts in my own mind. I'm  
21 just asking you.

22 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I would just like to say that  
23 our Constitution is based on the proposition that we should  
24 not trust our freedom to each other's sincerity. And so our  
25 Constitution provides very elaborate arrangements to guard

1 against those times when we each other may not be sincere.  
2 Certainly I think we do not want to conduct our foreign  
3 relations in such a way that we trust either our security or  
4 anyone else's independent to the sincerity of the Soviets, or  
5 anyone else.

6 The Soviet record on compliance is, of course, not good.  
7 Secretary Gorbachev's tenure is not certain, and it is simply  
8 not reasonable to entrust any people's future to the presumed  
9 good intention of any other leader of any other state, least  
10 of all one which has no better record of keeping agreements  
11 than the Soviet Union.

12 Senator Hecht. I appreciate that answer. I concur.

13 Now, Americans forget very fast. Do you feel that the  
14 pullout could be tied to a future alliance with India at the  
15 expense of Pakistan?

16 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Hecht, as you know, the  
17 Soviet analyst of foreign policy considered that their  
18 relationship with India, which is formalized in a Soviet-  
19 Indian Friendship Treaty, is already nearly an ideal one.  
20 Indeed, it is described as such in official Soviet speeches  
21 and statements on foreign affairs.

22 The relationship is close, it is reliable, and it has  
23 already resulted in substantial pressures overt and covert on  
24 Pakistan.

25 Senator Hecht. What do you feel five years from today

1 that will do to that area if we stop our help to Pakistan and  
2 Afghanistan?

3 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. First, I think we must not do  
4 it. And, second, I think were we to do it, and were we even  
5 to proceed on the basis of the agreement which is now  
6 contemplated, the result would be geostrategically devastat-  
7 ing.

8 It would give the Soviets reliable control of Afghanistan  
9 and put it in a position to maximally pressure Iran. It  
10 would give the Soviets reliable access from the Soviet Union  
11 across Afghanistan, Pakistan, India to China and China's  
12 borders, and to the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and that  
13 would be very serious.

14 Geostrategically, this is very serious. This is a  
15 vitally important region. And we must not make mistakes with  
16 it any more than we must make moral mistakes in our dealing  
17 with the extraordinarily courageous Afghan people.

18 Senator Hecht. I agree with you. I just wanted you to  
19 express your views to this group.

20 Thank you very much.

21 Senator Humphrey. Congressman McCollum.

22 Mr. McCollum. Thank you very much.

23 Ambassador Kirkpatrick, we've talked about what the

24 rumors are, but there are some facts out of all this. I  
25 think, one, we can say there is a fact there was some kind of

1 an understanding, some kind of a commitment on our part in  
2 1985 to be a guarantor of a vague and ambiguous eventual  
3 pullout circumstance. I know that. I've discussed it with  
4 some of the highest people involved in this personally. I'm  
5 not sure that I understand what that agreement is any more  
6 than you do in detail, nor what we stand to lose or gain  
7 today.

8 But one thing is clear, and that is that whatever that  
9 understanding might have been, it was not approved by the  
10 President of the United States, and as you've indicated, it  
11 is not anything which today we should consider binding and,  
12 at the very worst or best as you might look at it, what Dr.  
13 Brzezinski suggested would be, as certainly as far as I would  
14 ever want to go, to see us honoring such a thing, let us  
15 start from scratch. And I think you're agreeing to that,  
16 that's basically your view today, is it not?

17 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. That is correct.

18 Mr. McCollum. Secondly, I think it's a fact that there  
19 is going to be some negotiation here in the next few days,  
20 preliminary perhaps to the more formal one, between Secretary  
21 Shultz and those in authority in the Kremlin. And it's a  
22 fact that what you've said today in our hearing is going to  
23 be heard by those who are going to be advising Secretary  
24 Shultz, if not by him personally.

And I think you've made a very strong contribution, as

1 did Dr. Brzezinski, to that discussion in the inner circles  
2 by simply appearing here today. And we're extremely grateful  
3 you've raised the issues of these rumors, even if they're not  
4 factual. Some of them may be. There probably are some  
5 proposals down there, they wouldn't be rumors by some in very  
6 lower levels of our government. And they might--if you  
7 hadn't appeared to have done this today, they might have  
8 wound up being in the formal plate, things that shouldn't  
9 have been.

10 Third, it is a fact, and I know this again personally,  
11 that the United Nations has cut off the support you indicated  
12 in your testimony today. I don't know the reason for that,  
13 but if it's political, it certainly should be combatted  
14 immediately. If it is indeed a fact that they have a shortage  
15 in the world supply for the use of the UN organizations of  
16 kerosene and of the other commodities that are cut off, then  
17 it seems to me it behooves us, those members of this panel  
18 and the members of the government, and those interested, such  
19 as yourself, to do everything we can in the next few days to  
20 pressure other sources to provide that relief to the refugees.

21 Because, above all, beyond the fact they are resistance  
22 forces, they're refugees--I happen to be a member of the  
23 Immigration Refugee Committee over in the House, and I've  
24 spent a lot of time with refugees and the UN help. And there  
25 are other sources of these things.

1        So I encourage you and thank you for speaking out on  
2 that. I encourage you to support any effort to get more  
3 relief in that regard from other sources.

4        I'd like to ask you a question about your views on Dr.  
5 Brzezinski's comments with regard to the bifurcation of this  
6 whole process.

7        He indicated in his testimony, and I questioned him  
8 about it, that he felt that the government of Pakistan's  
9 concerns with regard to their being a transition government  
10 involving an alliance with Mujahideen, were something that  
11 was not in the best interest of this process and that,  
12 indeed, it would be better for us, and we'd be falling into a  
13 trap from what he said, and the Soviets, it would be better  
14 for us to go ahead and have a negotiated cutoff of aid at the  
15 same time that they actually really pull out, or whatever,  
16 you know, with circumstances and checks which I think most of  
17 us up here agreed was a reasonable suggestion compared to the  
18 rumors.

19        But I am curious as to what you think about the tie-in  
20 or the separation of the alliance or an understanding with  
21 regard to a transition government before or simultaneous with  
22 any Soviet withdrawal and our cutoff of aid.

23        Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman McCollum, I'm very  
24 glad you asked me that. I believe that the whole moral base  
25 of our position in respect to aid for the Afghan people, and



1 Mujahideen rests on our national commitment to self-determina-  
2 tion and respect for the independence of the Afghans and  
3 other countries in the region, the people in the region.

4 I believe that same respect for their right to organize  
5 their own lives and govern themselves should lead us to  
6 giving a kind of--taking great cognizance, giving great  
7 respect to the judgments of the governments in the region and  
8 the representatives of the people in the region about their  
9 future.

10 I do not believe we are the kind of great power who  
11 desires to impose settlements on smaller countries. I  
12 believe that with regard to the Afghan problem, Pakistan and  
13 the Afghan alliance are the front line states. And they  
14 deserve the same kind of respect that we give to the front  
15 line states in Africa, which is a very great deal of respect,  
16 as it should be.

17 I do not believe that we should seek to override the  
18 judgment of the alliance or the Pakistan government with  
19 regard to the question of an interim government. I think  
20 that we should in fact probably defer to their judgment on  
21 this question. They desire the withdrawal of the Soviet  
22 troops from Afghanistan. They are the front line states who  
23 suffer, live in greatest danger and suffer--stand to suffer  
24 most.

25 So I think we should give maximum weight to their

1 judgment on this matter.

2 Mr. McCollum. Well, thank you very much for those  
3 comments because I concur with you on those. I think that  
4 while there may be something to be said for Dr. Brzezinski's  
5 concept and perhaps the government of Pakistan, the alliance  
6 might want to consider the merits of his arguments if it is  
7 indeed a meritorious concern with regard to the Soviets. And  
8 I'm sure he presented them quite sincerely.

9 But, on the other hand, I certainly think you are  
10 absolutely right. It would be very wrong for us to try to  
11 impose our will against theirs. And I know from talking with  
12 them, and I'm sure you do too, that there is a sincere  
13 concern on the part of the government of Pakistan with regard  
14 to what's going to happen if we go forward without some  
15 understanding. And it may present terribly hardships on  
16 their government and politically not be feasible.

17 So I thank you for your comments.

18 I have taken more than my share of time but again thank  
19 you very much for being with us.

20 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

22 Congressman Wilson.

23 Mr. Wilson. Yes. Madam Ambassador, it's nice to see  
24 you again. It's such a special treat to be able to be on a

25 panel with a group of people in which you are in total

1 agreement and to have two witnesses in which you are in total  
2 agreement. It doesn't happen often for me.

3 I trust that you noted the acquisition by India of the  
4 peaceful nuclear submarine they just received from the Soviet  
5 Union.

6 I'm going to let the nebulous vague anonymous initial  
7 agreement go for the time being. But I do want to point out  
8 one more time that part of the Cordovez is saying this in  
9 agreement, and the people, in front of M-. Solarz's committee  
10 yesterday--there were two witnesses who are published often  
11 in the Times and in the Post, and the Chairman himself, who  
12 all are already beginning to believe Pakistan for everything  
13 as if they had invaded Afghanistan, and who are saying that  
14 Pakistan and the United States have been less than faithful  
15 to our 1985 agreement. And I can see it forming, I think my  
16 colleagues can too, and that's the reason for somewhat  
17 obsessive concern about this.

18 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. May I comment, please? Thank  
19 you, Congressman Wilson.

20 Well, perhaps I am somewhat less concerned about this  
21 than some people in Washington because I began to hear, by  
22 1984, in and around the United Nations that the problem in  
23 Afghanistan was really American recalcitrants and Pakistani  
24 recalcitrants, as though the problem began not with the  
25 invasion but with the resistance to the invasion.

1 Mr. Wilson. Exactly.

2 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. And I think it's particularly  
3 important that the United States not permit the scare of  
4 being blamed for problems in Afghanistan guide our conduct,  
5 because we have in fact been blamed for a number of years  
6 now, and are likely to be blamed whatever we do.

7 We should therefore, I think, be guided only by our own  
8 sense of what is right and appropriate.

9 Mr. Wilson. Thank you.

10 I would like to close by saying, and to invite a  
11 response, if you choose, however, I know that we're in  
12 agreement on this, but in these negotiations that the  
13 Secretary of State is about to begin, we should remember, if  
14 we remember nothing else, that we are not losing the fight.  
15 We are not the ones who have the great incentive and burden  
16 of carrying a negotiation. It's the Soviet Union who's got  
17 their hook on, not the United States. And for us to be  
18 overly eagerly pushing concessions upon them is pretty  
19 obscene. And I hope that this somehow--I guess, you know,  
20 Congressmen have a pervasive will to talk, boxers have a  
21 pervasive will to fight, wide receivers have a pervasive will  
22 to catch a pass, and the State Department people have a  
23 pervasive will to get to the negotiating table, no matter  
24 what, you know, just get us there.

And it's kind of scary. But the main thing is it's the

1 Soviet Union who's stuck, who's mired, who's taking murderous  
2 casualties and condemnation by the whole Free World with the  
3 exception of India. And let them come and say what they--let  
4 them make concessions along the line that you and Dr.  
5 Brzezinski did.

6 Senator Humphrey. Congressman Ritter.

7 Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 And it's always a pleasure, Dr. Kirkpatrick, to listen  
9 to your insightful pronouncements. Since I advocated one  
10 appointment just a little earlier, I might advocate another  
11 one. I would hope that the next Administration, if it were a  
12 Republican one, would choose by far the most qualified  
13 individual for the job as Secretary of State and it's you.

14 I want to again comment on my colleague from Texas. He  
15 said it better than I could ever say it. I mean, he knows  
16 all about wide receivers and the like. But, you know, it is  
17 ironic that we leave Vietnam clinging to the skids of  
18 helicopters, leaving behind those who sought freedom,  
19 cooperated with us to either die or be reeducated. And here  
20 we are bending over backwards, and I think it is the propen-  
21 sity of the State Department to enter into the kind of  
22 negotiations that, regardless of the facts and the realities,  
23 will lead us to peace.

24 We're bending over backwards to get the Soviets out of  
25 the big hole that they've dug for themselves, and somehow

1 come up with agreements that are wholly unrealistic, grabbed  
2 on, however, by the liberal forces, the left to center forces  
3 in the United States Congress.

4 I think we need to put this thing in perspective. And I  
5 think the gentleman from Texas has done it very well.

6 I have one question. Amnesty--no, Helsinki Watch has  
7 talked about 10,000 Afghan children who have been exported  
8 for indoctrination in various career paths in the Soviet  
9 Union. And as I understand it, this export of children  
10 continues unabated.

11 Now, how can we be led to believe that the Soviets are  
12 really interested in disengagement while they are still  
13 exporting, forcibly in many cases, Afghan children to the  
14 Soviet Union?

15 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Ritter, I believe  
16 that it would be reasonable to suppose that the Soviet Union,  
17 while interested in withdrawing, and I believe they are  
18 interested in withdrawing, is also interested in maintaining  
19 maximum influence in Afghanistan and in the area. And to  
20 that end, they look to the future.

21 Of course, there are many other evidences just now that  
22 they are making maximum use of their actual presence in  
23 Afghanistan to provide for future influence--"hegemony" I  
24 think Gramsci and other Marxists have called it.

Mr. Ritter. But wouldn't you think that we have no

1 reports from the Mujahideen and the different groups that  
2 maintain close contact with the Mujahideen, that the toy  
3 bombs that have been dropped over the years are being phased  
4 out, but little children and women continue to have their  
5 hands and feet blown off? Wouldn't you think that a gesture  
6 would be made and a stop dropping toy bombs since we're so  
7 close to reconciliation?

8 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Yes, I should certainly think  
9 so, Congressman.

10 Mr. Ritter. I have really no questions. I mean they've  
11 been asked and you've answered them. And I think your five  
12 points, they're kinds of things that maybe a Senatorial and a  
13 House concurrent resolution putting those five points into a  
14 letter could be distributed to our colleagues for signature  
15 and sent to our President.

16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Kirkpatrick,  
17 Ambassador.

18 Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Madam Ambassador, for your  
19 excellent testimony.

20 Our next witness is Ambassador Alan Keyes.

21 Ambassador, good morning. Welcome.

XXX \_ 1 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALAN L. KEYES, RESIDENT  
2 SCHOLAR, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE; FORMER  
3 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL  
4 ORGANIZATIONS AFFAIRS; FORMER UNITED STATES  
5 REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND  
6 SOCIAL COUNCIL

7 Ambassador Keyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 I have to begin by apologizing for my voice. I am like  
9 a lot of people, suffering from a little bit of flu here.  
10 But I thought it was very important--

11 Senator Humphrey. You probably got it from me. We were  
12 both campaigning together in New Hampshire, and I'm just  
13 getting over it myself. Please proceed.

14 Ambassador Keyes. I thought it was very important,  
15 however, in spite of that, to come out and share a few  
16 thoughts today that I think will introduce a perspective--  
17 well, it is essential agreement with that of the two witnesses  
18 who have gone before me. It does, I think, introduce some  
19 added elements.

20 For nearly a decade, the world has witnessed the  
21 devastation of Afghanistan and its people in a ruthless war  
22 of aggression launched and sustained by the government of the  
23 Soviet Union. The Soviets have maintained that war despite  
24 universal condemnation and repeated calls for their withdraw-  
25 al. However, as has been pointed out at the hearing, Mikhail



1 Gorbachev, I think on February 8th, made a Soviet proposal  
2 that was hailed, I think by the State Department, as a  
3 potential breakthrough. That provided for a 10-month phased  
4 withdrawal of Soviet troops "front-loaded," as has been  
5 described, provided that there was a simultaneous cutoff of  
6 international aid to the Afghan freedom fighters.

7 Now, anyone familiar with the brutal human suffering  
8 caused by the Soviet invasion must welcome the prospect of an  
9 agreement that would bring the invasion to an end. If the  
10 atmosphere produced by the Pearl Harbor Day Summit in December  
11 has produced a firm Soviet decision to end aggression in  
12 Afghanistan, we should certainly "give peace a chance," as  
13 Vice President Bush recently suggested. The challenge,  
14 however, is to distinguish between a settlement that ends  
15 Soviet aggression, and one that, by guaranteeing the achieve-  
16 ment of Soviet aims, permits aggression to succeed.

17 For nine bloody years, the people of Afghanistan have  
18 rejected the peace of subjection, the peace of surrender.  
19 Great care must be taken now to assure that no agreement  
20 offers the Soviets a chance to attain through negotiations  
21 the conditions they could not achieve by ruthless force of  
22 arms.

23 Now, it has already been mentioned by a number of people  
24 here about the possible existence, with the existence of a  
25 possible agreement entered into by some officials somewhere

1 in the State Department that committed the United States to  
2 an early cutoff. I do believe that this is the result of a  
3 habitual state of mind that I observed during my time working  
4 in the State Department since many people there approach  
5 negotiations such as these looking for an agreement the other  
6 side will accept rather than insisting on an agreement that  
7 serves justice and the interest of the United States and its  
8 partners.

9 Now, I think as we approach the Reagan-Gorbachev summit,  
10 the pressures to achieve an agreement at almost any cost,  
11 especially within the State Department, are going to grow,  
12 and that's why I think it's very important that there be  
13 hearings of this kind and that Congress take an active  
14 interest in this outcome. That is especially true when we  
15 consider the fact that it may be the case that in order to  
16 prevent further lapses by the State Department, some help is  
17 needed to assure that the President's clear will on this  
18 issue will be respected.

19 I'd like to talk for a minute about what I think are  
20 several built-in procedural defects in the current UN  
21 sponsored negotiations.

22 I think it's important to note that technically the  
23 negotiations do not focus on the Soviet invasion of Afghanis-  
24 tan per se, but on its consequences for Pakistan. Though the  
25 Afghan people have been the chief victims of aggression, the

1 resistance leaders have no assured role in the UN's sponsored  
2 process.

3 This structure relegates the concerns and aims of the  
4 Afghan people, at least potentially, to a secondary position.  
5 Moreover, I think the UN officials involved in the negotia-  
6 tions have motive for achieving an agreement that they can  
7 claim as a personal and institutional success regardless of  
8 its implications for the genuine independence and self-  
9 determination of the Afghan people.

10 Obviously, any agreement that results from such a  
11 process would have to be carefully scrutinized before they  
12 are accepted. I think that such an agreement should make  
13 clear that continuation of U.S. aid in some form would go on,  
14 at least until the last Soviet troops have left Afghan soil.  
15 It should insist that even then any cutoff of assistance to  
16 the freedom fighters be matched by the cutoff of all Soviet  
17 assistance to the puppet regime in Kabul. And it should  
18 insist that any withdrawal agreement guarantee the Afghan  
19 people's right to choose and maintain their own government,  
20 free from Soviet interference.

21 I think it's clear that the proposals put forward by Mr.  
22 Gorbachev, and some of the proposals that are now rumored  
23 floating Washington, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick said, fall far  
24 short of these requirements.

The issue of Soviet support for the Kabul regime is not

1 addressed. No guarantees are offered against future Soviet  
2 interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs. I think that  
3 the proposals as stated would expose and weaken the Afghan  
4 resistance while perpetuating the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.  
5 Even were such an agreement implemented, it could merely  
6 provide diplomatic cover for the consolidation of Soviet  
7 relations with Afghanistan aimed toward its gradual absorption  
8 within the Soviet empire.

9 Now, I think the substantive defects of the proposals  
10 appear even more important when you look at the difficulty of  
11 implementing and verifying any agreement once it is concluded  
12 and agreed to by all sides. It is obvious from other  
13 experience in the world that UN or other international  
14 monitoring and verification processes have inherent limita-  
15 tions and weaknesses that can tend to favor a party that is  
16 intent on violations.

17 Given the Soviet Union's border with Afghanistan, the  
18 variety and difficulty of the terrain involved and so forth,  
19 I think that verification of true Soviet withdrawal would be  
20 exceedingly difficult. I think that the whole question of  
21 whether one assumes the Soviets to be sincere or not may not  
22 be relevant.

23 But if, as was stated previously, one assumes that there  
24 was a desire to in some way perpetuate or achieve the goals  
25 of Soviet policy, I think there would have to be a lot of

1 opportunities to consider the similarity of the ethnic groups  
2 in Soviet, Central Asia and Afghanistan, the kind of ex-  
3 perience that we had with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan  
4 prior to the invasion when they had infiltrated into Afghanis-  
5 tan and placed cadres were instrumental in facilitating their  
6 influence in the country and their eventual invasion. There  
7 are a lot of opportunities for the Soviets to maintain this  
8 kind of influence in a way that would evade or subvert the  
9 intention of a withdrawal agreement.

10 Now, I think it's clear that some people say that we  
11 could respond to such violations if they occurred. One has  
12 to keep in mind, however, as the example of, for instance,  
13 Laos indicates, violations aren't always cut and dried. You  
14 get claims and counterclaims, and while everybody is arguing  
15 about whether they have occurred or not, the violations  
16 continue, and we all know that in a situation like that, our  
17 political situation in the United States is rather complicated  
18 would probably result in our hands being tied from taking an  
19 effective action in response while the haggling went on.

20 So I don't think it's an easy matter of turning the  
21 spigot on and turning it off and turning it back on again,  
22 even if we take the precaution suggested by Dr. Brzezinski of  
23 making sure that the infrastructure remains in place. I  
24 think we have to remind ourselves that our difficulties in  
25 foreign policy in recent years have not been the result of a

1 lack of infrastructure, but a lack of will and a lack of  
2 consensus agreement about the way that we should proceed, and  
3 that that situation could very well be produced if we get a  
4 weak agreement that allows the Soviets to violate while we  
5 have to sit on the sidelines and argue with each other about  
6 what we should do.

7       Given these considerations, the only reliable guarantee  
8 of Soviet compliance will be to maintain the military  
9 strength and cohesion of the resistance forces. The timetable  
10 of Soviet withdrawal must be short enough to preclude  
11 implementation of schemes for exploiting or evading the  
12 withdrawal terms. I think that 10 months is far too long. I  
13 would allude to a statement that was made by Dr. Fred Ikle  
14 last year at these Commission hearings, and I think it still  
15 holds true, I don't see why any more time is required for  
16 this withdrawal than it took for the Soviet invasion. And  
17 insofar as one is talking about a withdrawal period that is  
18 longer than logistically required to remove Soviet forces,  
19 you have to ask what is the purpose? And I think that the  
20 purpose can only be understood in political terms. And if  
21 the purpose is understood in political terms, what are the  
22 political intentions of the Soviets in trying to prolong the  
23 withdrawal period, what are their aims? And that I think is  
24 an important question that should be the focus of intention.

25       We talk about Soviet withdrawal, but a Soviet withdrawal

1 that succeeds in achieving the aims of Soviet policy will be  
2 a defeat for Afghani independence, and a defeat of the  
3 struggle that the Afghan resistance has waged these past nine  
4 years. It should not be allowed.

5 Finally, I believe that some efforts need to be made now  
6 to begin to address, to raise and address some of the issues  
7 that go toward the question of Soviet obligations toward  
8 Afghanistan once withdrawal is complete.

9 First of all, I think there has to be a clear and  
10 guaranteed pledge of complete Soviet non-interference in  
11 Afghanistan. I think it should even go so far as to say  
12 complete Soviet non-presence in Afghanistan, except perhaps  
13 the diplomatic minimum. I think it's going to take some time  
14 to sanitize the country once you've had an invasion like  
15 this. I also think that that kind of an insistence would  
16 make it harder for the Soviets to evade the intention of a  
17 withdrawal agreement by other means in terms of their  
18 presence in the country.

19 But, in order to do that, I think another issue has to  
20 be looked at. In the nine years of Soviet aggression,  
21 hundreds of thousands, indeed the most recent estimate that  
22 Senator Humphrey has pointed out is over a million Afghans  
23 have been killed, maimed, disabled, including tens of  
24 thousands of children who were the targets of coldly calcu-  
25 lated campaign of Soviet terror.

1 Scores of villages have been razed. Two thousand  
2 schools and more than a hundred medical establishments have  
3 been destroyed. Millions of people have been forced to flee  
4 their country and to live as refugees in Pakistan. The  
5 emphasis on speedy and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces  
6 from Afghanistan has justifiably received the first and  
7 highest priority in international concern. But I think the  
8 question remains, who will bear the cost of Soviet aggression?  
9 Who will foot the bill for repairing the human and material  
10 damage caused by the Soviet invaders?

11 The international community has already expended over a  
12 billion dollars to provide humanitarian support for the  
13 Afghan refugees that the invasion drove into Pakistan. The  
14 world clearly owes a debt of gratitude and respect to the  
15 people and government of Pakistan for the generous spirit  
16 they have shown in receiving this refugee populations. Will  
17 the international community also have to bear the entire cost  
18 of repairing the destruction wrought by Soviet arms? And I  
19 think that's not an academic question. The kinds of agencies  
20 that are likely to be involved in that rehabilitation,  
21 UNICEF, UNPP, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and so  
22 forth are organizations that are supported by western and a  
23 substantial amount of American assistance to which the  
24 Soviets give relatively little. And that would mean that the  
25 burden of paying for the destruction that they have wrought



1 would fall on outsiders and the international community and  
2 on the American taxpayer, and I hardly think that that  
3 represents a just outcome.

4       Therefore, I think that the Soviets should withdraw from  
5 Afghanistan immediately. But as part of any final settlement  
6 of the war of aggression that they launched, they should  
7 agree to pay in hard currency for the lives they have  
8 destroyed and the damage they have caused. The amount of  
9 such reparation should be determined by an independent and  
10 impartial international commission. This forthright means of  
11 dealing with the reparations issue will also preclude efforts  
12 by the Soviets to perpetuate their hold on Afghanistan  
13 through unequal economic arrangements. It will eliminate any  
14 pretext for Soviet economic assistance programs that allow  
15 the Soviets to deplete Afghanistan's natural resources, while  
16 encouraging its economic dependence upon the Soviet Union.

17       There have been reports recently in the press that  
18 indicate that such agreements are being concluded, either  
19 with the regime in Kabul or with chieftains in other parts of  
20 Afghanistan. I think that these arrangements offer a pretext  
21 for continued Soviet presence and interference in Afghanistan  
22 and that, as part of a conclusion of this entire episode,  
23 they should be declared null and void and not binding on a  
24 truly independent government when it comes to power.

25       Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  
(Statement follows)

## STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ALAN L. KEYES

For nearly a decade the world has witnessed the devastation of Afghanistan and its people in a ruthless war of aggression launched and sustained by the government of the Soviet Union. Despite universal international condemnation, and repeated calls for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Soviet leaders have until now responded with stubborn indifference or clearly cosmetic public relations gestures. On February 8, however, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev put forward a Soviet proposal that many, including the State Department, have hailed as a potential breakthrough. Provided an agreement cutting off international aid to the Afghan freedom fighters can be concluded by March 15 of this year, Gorbachev announced, the Soviets would agree to begin, on May 15, a 10 month phased withdrawal of their forces. The withdrawal would be "front-loaded", with 50 percent of all Soviet forces departing in the initial months.

Anyone familiar with the brutal human suffering caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan must welcome the prospect of an agreement that would bring the invasion to an end. If the atmosphere produced by the "Pearl Harbor Day" summit in December has produced a firm Soviet decision to end Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, we should certainly "give peace a chance", as Vice-President Bush recently suggested. The challenge, however, is to distinguish between a settlement that ends Soviet aggression, and one that, by guaranteeing the achievement of Soviet aims, permits

aggression to succeed. For nine bloody years the people of Afghanistan have rejected the peace of subjection, the peace of surrender. Great care must be taken now to assure that no agreement offers the Soviets a chance to attain through negotiations the conditions they could not achieve by ruthless force of arms.

Given the need for such care, those of us who support the Afghan freedom fighters welcome the Congressional interest represented by these hearings. State Department officials habitually approach negotiations such as these looking for an agreement the other side will accept, rather than insisting on an agreement that serves justice and the interests of the United States. As we approach the June date envisaged for the next Reagan-Gorbachev summit, pressures may grow, especially within the State Department, to achieve an agreement on Soviet withdrawal at almost any cost. High State Department officials have already admitted that, without President Reagan's knowledge or approval, they indicated US willingness to accept and guarantee a UN-sponsored withdrawal agreement that would prematurely cut off international aid to the Afghan resistance.

Congress can help the President prevent further such lapses by the State Department's leadership. To do so, however, it must carefully consider the potential pitfalls, the opportunities for Soviet success, in the process and results of the ongoing negotiations.

The current UN sponsored negotiations have several built in procedural defects. Technically, the negotiations do not focus on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but on its consequences for Pakistan. Though the Afghan people have been the chief victims of aggression, the resistance leaders have no assured role in the UN sponsored process. This structure relegates the concerns and aims of the Afghan people to a secondary position. Moreover, the UN officials involved in the negotiations, have motives for achieving an agreement that they can claim as a personal and institutional success, regardless of its implications for the genuine independence and self-determination of the Afghan people.

Any proposals that result from such a process as this should be carefully scrutinized before they are accepted. Congress should make clear that any agreement must allow the continuation of US aid to the resistance at least until the last Soviet troops have left Afghan soil. It should insist that even then any cut-off of assistance to the freedom fighters be matched by the cut-off of all Soviet assistance to the puppet regime in Kabul. It should insist that any withdrawal agreement guarantee the Afghan people's right to choose and maintain their own government, free from any Soviet interference.

The proposals recently put forward by Mr. Gorbachev fall well short of meeting these requirements. They would involve a ten month period after the cut-off of

international aid to the freedom fighters. The Soviets could exploit this period of vulnerability to seek military advantages they cannot attain under present conditions. The issue of Soviet support for the Kabul regime is not addressed. No guarantees are offered against future Soviet interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs. In sum, the proposals would expose and weaken the Afghan resistance while perpetuating the pro-Soviet puppet regime in Kabul. Even were such an agreement implemented, it could merely provided diplomatic cover for the consolidation of Soviet relations with Afghanistan aimed toward its gradual absorption within the Soviet empire.

The substantive defects of the proposals appear even more important when one considers the difficulty of implementing and verifying an agreement once it is concluded and agreed to by all sides. Any UN or other international monitoring and verification process has inherent limitations and weaknesses that tend to favor a party intent on violations. Given the Soviet Union's border with Afghanistan, the variety and difficulty of the terrain involved and so forth, verification of Soviet withdrawal would be exceedingly difficult. Any monitoring force would be heavily dependent on official Soviet cooperation and sources of information. Evidence stage managed in Kabul could be quietly reversed in the countryside.

Some argue that the US could respond to Soviet violations of an agreement by resuming aid to the

resistance. Unfortunately, such matters are not so easily arranged. Violations would be the subject of disputes and counterclaims, leaving the situation too murky to permit a clear US response. While the haggling went on, Soviet violations could continue, with the US and other international supporters of the Afghan resistance politically constrained from responding effectively.

Given these considerations the only reliable guarantee of Soviet compliance will be to maintain the military strength and cohesion of the resistance forces. The timetable of Soviet withdrawal must be short enough to preclude implementation of schemes for exploiting or evading the withdrawal terms. Ten months is far too long. As then Undersecretary of Defense Dr. Fred Ikle told the task force a year ago "No more time is required for this withdrawal than it took for the initial Soviet invasion". He went on to say that "even if the Soviets were to carefully pack up the equipment and take it out, which may be desirable, it wouldn't take longer than two weeks". A longer withdrawal period can only offer the Soviets an opportunity to achieve the political aims of their aggression.

Finally, I believe that efforts should be made now to raise and address the issue of Soviet obligations toward Afghanistan once complete withdrawal has been achieved. In the nine years of Soviet aggression hundreds of thousands of Afghans, have been killed, maimed and disabled, including tens of thousands of children, who were the targets of a

coldly calculated campaign of Soviet terror. Scores of villages have been razed, 2000 schools and more than a hundred medical establishments have been destroyed. Millions of people have been forced to flee their country and to live as refugees in neighboring Pakistan. The emphasis on speedy and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan has justifiably received the first and highest priority in international concern. But the question remains- who will bear the cost of Soviet aggression? Who will foot the bill for repairing the human and material damage caused by the Soviet invaders?

The international community has already expended over a billion dollars to provide humanitarian support for the Afghan refugees the invasion drove into Pakistan. The world owes a debt of gratitude and respect to the people and government of Pakistan for the generous spirit they have shown in receiving this refugee population. Will the international community also have to bear the entire cost of repairing the destruction wrought by Soviet arms?

The Soviets should withdraw from Afghanistan immediately. But as part of any final settlement terminating their war of aggression, they should agree to pay, in hard currency, for the the lives they have destroyed and the damage they have caused. The amount of such reparations should be determined by an independent and impartial

---

[For estimates of the total human and material damage inflicted see State Department Special Report Number 177.

international commission. This forthright means of dealing with the reparations issue will also preclude efforts by the Soviets to perpetuate their hold on Afghanistan through unequal economic arrangements. It will eliminate any pretext for Soviet economic assistance programs that allow the Soviets to deplete Afghanistan's natural resources, while encouraging its economic dependence upon the Soviet Union. Recent press reports indicate that they have concluded such agreements with some elements in Afghanistan, including the obviously subject regime in Kabul. These arrangements offer a pretext for continued Soviet presence and interference in Afghanistan, and should be declared null and void.



1 Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

2 I have to take a call, but I'll turn to my colleague,  
3 Congressman McCollum, and ask him to proceed with questions.  
4 And I have my own, of course.

5 Mr. McCollum. Mr. Ambassador, I think your testimony  
6 has been illuminating, and I think that it in much more  
7 details perhaps even than Dr. Brzezinski and Ambassador  
8 Kirkpatrick, gets at the heart of what we need to be looking  
9 into as we go through this process.

10 I have a question of some practicality here, I suppose.  
11 There's been some discussion about stockpiling enough  
12 material inside Afghanistan to tide over the resistance for a  
13 period of time while the Soviets withdraw or post withdrawal  
14 or whatever. Obviously that has also been a concern on the  
15 other side, that the Soviets might stockpile equipment for  
16 someone else, and I think Dr. Brzezinski raised that.

17 Do you know from your work what the practicality of that  
18 type of effort would be? Can we or could we in the next few  
19 weeks stockpile sufficient resources inside Afghanistan to  
20 allow us to cut off aid and just walk away like some are  
21 suggesting we might do in these rumors?

22 Ambassador Keyes. Well, I wouldn't want to try to  
23 comment on the logistical possibility of that since I don't  
24 think that my own expertise extends there.

25 It does seem to me that it would be possible to sort of

1 load up the pipeline, assuming that you weren't dismantling  
2 the pipeline, as Mr. Brzezinski pointed out.

3 But I would want to say this, because I think involved  
4 in that question are greater difficulties than logistical  
5 difficulties. And the thing that concerns me, when I think  
6 about that way of dealing with the problem of an imbalanced  
7 agreement, is that the political consequences of the agreement  
8 have to be dealt with. The perception that an agreement has  
9 been achieved on Soviet withdrawal, that somehow involves the  
10 diminution or cessation of support for the Afghan resistance,  
11 is going to produce, I think, a political impact. That  
12 agreement is probably going to produce a political impact in  
13 Pakistan; it's going to produce a political impact in the  
14 refugee camps, and so forth.

15 The question then arises what will the consequence of  
16 that be? Are we in a simple situation where the Afghan  
17 resistance, for instance, can easily maintain its coherence  
18 as it did in the face of the Soviet invasion? Will there be  
19 efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to foment disturbances  
20 and disagreements and other kinds of problems either among  
21 the resistance or between the resistance and the Pakistanis,  
22 their resistance in ourselves? That would complicate, I  
23 think, not the question of whether or not the resistance had  
24 these weapons, but whether or not the political environment  
25 still existed that allowed the most effective use of them.

1 And that's why I think the question of the coherence and  
2 strength of the resistance should be a major part of our  
3 considerations as we approach this agreement, not simply an  
4 afterthought which we think we can resolve simply by funneling  
5 in weapons since I think you have to address the political  
6 question explicitly.

7 Mr. McCollum. Mr. Ambassador, how do you fall on the  
8 issue that was raised earlier by Dr. Brzezinski and which  
9 Ambassador Kirkpatrick commented about, separating out the  
10 withdrawal and the aid cutoff and whatever from the ultimate  
11 transition or whatever happens with regard to a government  
12 that includes the Mujahideen? Do you think that can be or  
13 should be done? Should it be left up to the government of  
14 Pakistan to be the deciding force here, as Ambassador  
15 Kirkpatrick suggested? How do you fall on that issue?

16 Ambassador Keyes. Well, I would say this. As regards  
17 the simple question of withdrawal, I would agree with Mr.  
18 Brzezinski only thus far, that I don't see any particular  
19 reason why Soviet withdrawal has to be linked to anything  
20 else. The Soviets could simply withdraw. And that is what  
21 they should do.

22 Now, the fact that they are unwilling to do so has to  
23 give rise to certain questions and concerns about their  
24 ultimate aims and intentions in Afghanistan.

25 In the face of those questions, because I think that--

1 let's assume the worst, that the ultimate aim of Soviet  
2 policy is to be able to withdraw Soviet troops while maintain-  
3 ing Soviet domination. And to do this, one must maintain a  
4 pro-Soviet puppet regime in Kabul, one must establish a  
5 regime that is militarily strong enough to at least continue  
6 substantial resistance to the Afghan freedom fighters, and  
7 that one creates a political environment in which it is  
8 possible to fragment the freedom fighters to such a degree  
9 that that puppet regime will have such chance of success  
10 regarding it.

11 Now, if that is the Soviet aim, then I think it might be  
12 a great error not to address the political issue of the  
13 explicit political position of the Afghan resistance in the  
14 context of any withdrawal.

15 That's what I meant a minute ago. I don't think that  
16 one can simply back away from that question. And, in that  
17 regard, I would agree with Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I think.

18 I think that both the Pakistanis and the resistance  
19 leaders are sensitive to the complexities of their own  
20 environment, and the impact psychologically and politically  
21 which any settlement is likely to have on their position, on  
22 their forces, on their supporters.

23 That, I think, has led them to be concerned to make sure  
24 that their political position in a post-withdrawal period is  
25 carefully addressed and established beforehand. And I think

1 one has to take that seriously because there are obviously  
2 difficulties with it, but I don't think one simply can  
3 dismiss it in a headlong rush for the withdrawal of Soviet  
4 forces.

5 Mr. McCollum. Dr. Brzezinski seemed to be saying that  
6 he had no faith that any kind of an accord that would allow a  
7 transition government could ever be reached because the  
8 Mujahideen wouldn't agree among themselves because they  
9 wouldn't agree with any portion of the existing government,  
10 the puppet government to be a party to it, et cetera, et  
11 cetera.

12 It sounds like he was just dismissing this without any  
13 effort to go into it as something that would stall the  
14 process, or give the Soviets some kind of an advantage.

15 You don't see the Soviets gaining an advantage as he  
16 does with regard to that process being part of this whole  
17 package?

18 Ambassador Keyes. Well, I think it is quite possible  
19 the Soviets would try to use a situation of that sort as an  
20 excuse possibly for their presence in Afghanistan. But it  
21 would only be a pretext.

22 I do think that I have to say I'm prejudging the  
23 question of how one could address the issue of the political  
24 position of the Afghan resistance. I'm just saying it has to  
25 be addressed.

1 I find that I am uncomfortable with the idea of a  
2 transitional government in which the Afghan resistance would  
3 have to participate on an equal or subsidiary footing with  
4 the regime that has cooperated in the invasion and destruction  
5 of Afghanistan and its people.

6 I could certainly understand if there are people among  
7 the freedom fighters who feel uncomfortable with that. But I  
8 do think that the key question is to make sure that both,  
9 while negotiations are going on and when they have achieved  
10 their results and Soviet withdrawal is taking place, the  
11 political position of the Afghan resistance is formally  
12 established and respected. And I think it would go too far  
13 to say that it ought to be established and respected as the  
14 presumptive legitimate government of the people of Afghanis-  
15 tan, as clearly they do represent the people, especially the  
16 millions in exile, but also those within the country who have  
17 been resisting Soviet aggression.

18 In my mind, that represents the defeat of Soviet policy  
19 in Afghanistan, and that should be our goal.

20 Mr. McCollum. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. I  
21 think the Chairman has returned to his seat in about time to  
22 collect his thoughts, because I could ask you a lot of  
23 questions other than the ones that I intended to ask.

24 So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back to you if  
25 that's appropriate.

1 Senator Humphrey. I apologize for my absence, but I had  
2 to take a call that could not be arranged for another time.

3 Mr. Ambassador, you served as Assistant Secretary of  
4 State for International Organizations Affairs; you served  
5 before that as United States Representative to the U.N.  
6 Economic and Social Council; you served as a consultant to  
7 the National Security Council; you served on the State  
8 Department Policy Planning Staff. You began, I guess, your  
9 career in public policy--foreign policy, I should say--in the  
10 State Department as a--.

11 Ambassador Keyes. Career officer.

12 Senator Humphrey. Well, that gives you an important  
13 perspective. You were not just a political appointee by this  
14 administration; you began as a career officer in the State  
15 Department.

16 I want to explore a couple of points that you raised in  
17 your testimony. Well, first, from your background in the  
18 State Department as a career officer, you said something  
19 about there being a propensity to achieve agreements accep-  
20 table to the other but not necessarily--I don't want to put  
21 words in your mouth--can you restate that?

22 Ambassador Keyes. Yes, I said I have observed that  
23 State Department officials have a propensity or an approach  
24 habitually to approach negotiations looking for an agreement  
25 the other side will accept rather than insisting on an

1 agreement that serves the interests of justice and the United  
2 States.

3 Senator Humphrey. Why did you make that statement?

4 Ambassador Keyes. Because I think it's true.

5 Senator Humphrey. Do you think it applies in this case?

6 Ambassador Keyes. I think it certainly is possible that  
7 it applies in this case. I found that in my experience in  
8 working with people through U.N. negotiations when I was  
9 involved with them on various issues, both during my two  
10 years as Assistant Secretary and prior to that, that there  
11 was a decided tendency for the first suggestion or the first  
12 consideration to be, well, what kind of proposals will get us  
13 an agreement, rather than sitting down and saying, what do  
14 we, the United States and others, want to get out of this,  
15 and how do we go about achieving it--being clear about those  
16 goals.

17 I think that's especially true in the U.N. environment,  
18 and, since we are talking about a process that in some degree  
19 involves U.N. negotiations has to be kept in mind, I happen  
20 to think that that particular approach, which is not practiced  
21 by anybody else, by the way, except maybe the Europeans--but,  
22 generally speaking, the people who sit across the table from  
23 me, be they Soviets or people from the developing countries  
24 on other issues, they generally come and sit down and they  
25 present a point of view that is quite beyond even what their



1 minimal requirements will be. We have already, generally  
2 speaking, tried to come up with a position that reasonably  
3 reflects what we regard as an acceptable package, having  
4 already made certain concessions to the other side.

5 One of the reasons that I thought it was important, for  
6 instance, to raise the whole issue of reparations today is  
7 because we look at the Afghan situation as if somebody should  
8 come into your house, your neighbor, kill your wife, kill  
9 your children, destroy your furnishings; when you finally get  
10 the drop on him, he looks at you and says, okay, I'll go now,  
11 and everything is fine. I don't think any of us would regard  
12 that as justice, and yet, in a certain sense, the whole  
13 discussion has lowered the standard of what is both just and  
14 in our interest by not even examining certain issues, so that  
15 there is the possibility the Soviets will, to the general  
16 applause of everybody, simply withdraw from Afghanistan maybe  
17 in a way that perpetuates their influences, meanwhile leaving  
18 the overhanging question of the terrible damage that they  
19 have done to the country completely unaddressed, and we will  
20 regard that as a just outcome.

21 Well, I think that not having put that kind of a  
22 question on the table in the first place is an example of the  
23 wrong way of going about negotiations such as these.

24 Senator Humphrey. Well, with regard to reparations,  
25 just to follow on that point for a moment, before we go back

1 to some other things, in your opinion what would be an  
2 appropriate way for the Soviets to repair, to the extent a  
3 country can, the damage its occupation has wrought?

4 Ambassador Keyes. Well, I think that the first and most  
5 appropriate way for them to begin repairing the damages is to  
6 get out and stay out.

7 Senator Humphrey. Yes.

8 Ambassador Keyes. And that means that any way of  
9 addressing this issue cannot involve any kind of continued  
10 Soviet presence of any kind. I don't think an economic  
11 presence is a good idea, I don't think economic assistance  
12 programs are a good idea. I think they ought to part with  
13 what is most painful for them to part with, hard cash. They  
14 always hate giving that up. They won't give it to the U.N.;  
15 they always pay in rubles, which are non-convertible curren-  
16 cies.

17 But I think it would be important therefore to insist  
18 that any such issue be addressed in hard currency terms, that  
19 it be turned over to a truly representative, independent  
20 government of Afghanistan to be used in the way that that  
21 government sees fit, because I think in the end isn't that  
22 the meaning of independence? The meaning of independence is  
23 that the government gets to decide what it's going to do with  
24 the authority of the people it represents. I presume that  
25 they would then be used in the context of the kind of

1 programs that are developed by the U.N. Development Program,  
2 by other U.N. agencies, to help rebuild the country.

3 So I think that hard cash turned over to the government  
4 so that it can be used in that form, with no strings attached,  
5 no Soviet presence involved, would be the way to deal with  
6 that issue.

7 Senator Humphrey. You are calling for reparations in  
8 hard cash. How could that outcome be secured?

9 Ambassador Keyes. Well, I don't know. As I say, I  
10 don't think it would be a good idea to introduce that as an  
11 issue tied to withdrawal. They should get out, and that  
12 issue should simply be settled.

13 But I think it is clear to point out that, formally  
14 speaking, I think one would have to say when somebody invades  
15 your country, a state of war exists between you and them.  
16 And for that state of war to be terminated and for the  
17 Soviets to really be accepted, if you like, back into the  
18 international fold, I think they have to do more than sort  
19 of, you know, get out and not even say they are sorry, which,  
20 as Ambassador Kirkpatrick indicates, they have not done.

21 I think that it would be important to address the  
22 question of their responsibility for what they have done.

23 Now, there is no way they can bring the dead back to  
24 life; there is no way they can assuage the grief of the  
25 mothers whose children have been maimed, whose husbands and

1 kin have been lost. But I do think that there is a way  
2 obviously, as has been done in past conflicts, World War II,  
3 other things--there is a way to address the question of how  
4 those who are culpable can help to address the issue of  
5 rehabilitating the damage that they have done. And, as I  
6 say, I think an international commission set up, assess the  
7 damage, come up with a figure which I think the Soviets  
8 should then be obliged to accept. And it's the kind of thing  
9 that could be formalized, if you like, in the context of a  
10 Security Council resolution, whatever, that would then give a  
11 formal existence to this process.

12 Senator Humphrey. Well, you've brought forward a new  
13 proposal, an important proposal; I think it's probably been in  
14 the minds of a lot of people, but, as far as I know, I've  
15 never heard it formulated before. And I think you are  
16 absolutely right, we are talking about justice, doing justice  
17 to the people of Afghanistan. And if the war were to end  
18 today, if the last Soviet troop was leaving today, the  
19 suffering of the Afghan people will continue for decades  
20 surely, given the utter desolation wrought in that country by  
21 the Soviet Army.

22 And so the difficulties of the Afghan people are far  
23 from over under the best of circumstances.

24 Let's talk about the withdrawal, since that is the  
25 matter that seems to be the imminent concern. You made an

1 important point: to the extent the withdrawal is not based,  
2 as we originally insisted, as this government originally  
3 insisted, on strictly logistical criteria--to the extent that  
4 it is not based on logistical criteria, what reasons do the  
5 Soviets have for drawing it out? What are they up to, do you  
6 suppose?

7 Ambassador Keyes. Well, that's why I distinguish  
8 between the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the abandonment  
9 of Soviet aims. I think it would be premature for us to  
10 conclude that the Soviet leadership has abandoned the aims of  
11 its invasion of Afghanistan. I think, as Ambassador  
12 Kirkpatrick has indicated, they may have concluded that this  
13 particular means of achieving their aim was a miscalculation,  
14 given the kind of response they've gotten. But I don't think  
15 that means they have abandoned those aims. And there are  
16 other ways of achieving the same goals.

17 If, through the withdrawal of their forces, they can  
18 assuage international opinion--the unfortunate truth about it  
19 is that the international community forgets these things  
20 after a time--and the Soviets maintain their border, they  
21 maintain the possibilities of infiltrated influence, and I  
22 think were quite skillful at using it in the past.

23 So I think it's at least possible that the Soviet goal  
24 would be to produce such a settlement. But if you look at  
25 the exact terms of what Mr. Gorbachev said on February 8th,

1 the result would be that the Soviets would continue--let's  
2 just accept it as given--the Soviets would continue their  
3 support of the Kabul regime, the United States and other  
4 international supporters of the Afghan resistance would cut  
5 off their assistance the moment the first Soviet troop, or  
6 even before, crossed the border. And a lot of leeway would  
7 be left.

8 And also, as I recall, Soviet forces are precluded from  
9 offensive action. It's not clear to me that anything is said  
10 about the forces of the puppet regime in Afghanistan.

11 I would have to say, although I haven't at all been  
12 involved in any of these kinds of things--any of us who read  
13 spy novels can recall that there are various ways, some of  
14 which reportedly have been practiced, for instance, in  
15 Angola, where those who are of ethnically similar background  
16 --you know, you can put on a uniform, which, in any case, the  
17 uniform of the Afghan government troops is supplied by the  
18 Soviet Union. So it is quite clear that it would be possible  
19 to have a little confusion in regard of just what personnel  
20 were involved, what forces were involved, and so forth.

21 So if you accept Gorbachev's proposal at face value, it  
22 would leave them with the whip hand. That's the proposal  
23 they laid on the table. That's just that in the best of all  
24 possible worlds right now for them they want the whip hand,  
25 and they want a solution that will basically allow them to

1 defeat the Afghan resistance in a post-withdrawal period by  
2 removing their support, by maintaining the support of the  
3 Kabul regime, and by leaving a situation that is sufficiently  
4 ambiguous that their support of the Kabul military forces  
5 could perpetuate their ability to continue to put military  
6 pressure on the resistance.

7 That is clearly unacceptable, but it does indicate the  
8 thinking. In other words, when they sat down and came up  
9 with that particular proposal, I think one would have to  
10 conclude that, given the time frame and given the other  
11 conditions, they have not abandoned their purposes in  
12 Afghanistan.

13 Senator Humphrey. Well, again, focusing on the ten  
14 months versus the two or three that a logistically based  
15 withdrawal ought to take, are you suggesting that the Soviets  
16 hope that the puppet regime, fully and continually resupplied,  
17 can defeat, damage, destroy the resistance during that ten  
18 months when supplies are cut off from outside sources? Is  
19 that what you think they are up to?

20 Ambassador Keyes. Well, I'm not sure; I'm not sure it  
21 would be necessary to say that they envisage a defeat for the  
22 resistance during that period of time. But I do think that  
23 that period of time could be used to put pressure on the  
24 resistance, to try to foment fragmentation of the resistance.

25 And I think that's particularly true. I don't know at what

1 stage everyone envisages the return of the refugees from  
2 Pakistan. I find it very disturbing that there are reports  
3 that their sustenance is being somehow restricted. That  
4 suggests to me that somebody may be putting some pressure on  
5 them, or using them as a way of putting pressure on the  
6 resistance leadership, which I think would be very unaccep-  
7 table and should be looked into.

8 But at the same time an immediate influx of those  
9 refugees into Afghanistan--that's another thing that I mean  
10 by the sort of consequences of the agreement--I think that  
11 creates an incredibly complicated situation in terms of who  
12 is responsible for their welfare, what authority is going to  
13 be the authority that is responsible for them, is the Afghan  
14 resistance in a position and recognized and established  
15 enough to take that authority, would this become an excuse  
16 for the Kabul government to try to get involved--all of these  
17 sorts of questions are being left open.

18 And so you could have a period during that ten months of  
19 tremendous confusion, which I think could have adverse  
20 consequences for the Afghan resistance, especially if  
21 assistance to them has been cut off and the kind of ties and  
22 ongoing relationships that assistance implies to support  
23 their cohesion have also been reduced or terminated. So I  
24 think that that ten-month period could be used to sow the  
25 seeds of a lot of difficulties and confusions, which, if the



1 Kabul government were then left in place as a sort of  
2 strongest recognized force still getting support from the  
3 Soviet government, would then mean that in the following  
4 period they would have an upper hand during that period,  
5 when, I'm afraid, the international community might be  
6 looking somewhere else than looking keenly at this problem,  
7 having concluded that no Soviets are there, now the problem  
8 is solved.

9 I don't think that that would be an acceptable outcome,  
10 because I think we have to keep in mind that the invasion may  
11 have been a mistake in which the Soviets tried to achieve in  
12 a short period of time what they can only achieve in a longer  
13 period of time. But my little knowledge of the way in which  
14 the Soviet empire extended into central Asia and other parts  
15 of the world suggests that this is a digestion process, and  
16 the Soviet empire has often taken a long time. This is a  
17 setback; it may not be a renunciation. What I think we have  
18 to insist upon is that the conditions on which the withdrawal  
19 occurs are conditions which guarantee that, whether or not  
20 they wish to renounce, the conditions are such that they have  
21 to renounce their efforts to dominate the Afghan people.

22 Senator Humphrey. Let me focus on one element of your  
23 statement just then, the reduction in assistance to the  
24 refugees. That is more than just a rumor, it's a fact. And  
25 I read from this FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

1 government document--you are well acquainted with it, of  
2 course--quoting the Pakistani chief commissioner for Afghan  
3 refugees--is that his correct title? He is a member of the  
4 Pakistani government, right, Mr. Rostam Shah Mahmoud [phone-  
5 tic]--and I've distributed this for the press: "Mr. Shah  
6 disclosed that international agencies, notably the World Food  
7 Program and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees,  
8 have stopped commodity aid consisting of sugar, tea, and  
9 powdered milk to the refugees from January this year. This  
10 is going to adversely affect living standards of the refugees,  
11 who are already suffering from malnutrition, poor sanitation,  
12 and a host of other ailments. Quoting Mr. Mahmoud: 'We have  
13 tried to impress upon the donors the dire need for continuing  
14 the aid, but they have their own reasons and problems, one of  
15 which is the diversion of a big chunk of aid to refugees in  
16 Sudan and Ethiopia, who are facing death and starvation and  
17 need immediate relief and succor."

18 And while we understand the situation in other parts of  
19 the world and want to attend to those situations adequately,  
20 this sounds to me like either bureaucratic bungling or an  
21 insidious form of repatriation, forcing people out by heaping  
22 greater privation upon already pitiful privation--cutting off  
23 powdered milk, for heaven's sake--those kids are starving as  
24 it is.

1 frankly, I wasn't aware of it, and I'm going to raise some  
2 hell about that as effectively as I can.

3 What do you think we should do, Mr. Ambassador? We seem  
4 to be in a position where we have committed to do something  
5 that would represent an injustice and an indecency--that is,  
6 the cut-off of aid up front completely while the Soviet  
7 puppet forces are continually resupplied for a period of  
8 perhaps ten months. This grievously jeopardizes the gains  
9 the Afghans have won through enormous suffering.

10 What should we do at this point?

11 Ambassador Keyes. Well, I think that, though I admire  
12 Mr. Brzezinski's ingenuity in making a proposal that would in  
13 some way preserve the formal aspects of that agreement--I  
14 don't even know whether I want to call it that, because I'm  
15 not sure what it actually was--I think that it's clear that  
16 whatever happened, it happened both in a certain context in  
17 the course of negotiations that have give and take back and  
18 forth. Such agreements are not in any sense permanently  
19 binding, and, judging by what I saw, a report that there was  
20 in the present letter that Mr. Whitehead had sent to Cordovez  
21 even in that letter, which seemed to be sort of an ack-  
22 nowledgement of some kind of agreement--it was pointed out  
23 that it was contingent on a number of things, including  
24 acceptable terms of a settlement, and that would include the  
25 timetable and other sorts of things.

1        So all such things, no matter where they come from, are  
2    ad referendum, and ad referendum means both referring to your  
3    government and referring to the circumstances. And I think  
4    it's quite clear that under those circumstances--one, ad  
5    referendum to the government, since the President wasn't  
6    involved, we can simply say no. I used to do that all the  
7    time. When I was negotiating, you send out your negotiators,  
8    they do their best, you make sure you are not committed; when  
9    they come back and show you an unacceptable agreement, you  
10   say you didn't tell me about this--no, here's what we really  
11   need. I think the President is in a position to do that, and  
12   ought to do it.

13        Senator Humphrey. Let me press you a little bit on  
14   that. Let me just play the devil's advocate. To me the  
15   response is going to be: well, we don't expect a personal  
16   letter from the President, we assume that when the State  
17   Department negotiates with us they are negotiating under the  
18   authority of the President of the United States, therefore  
19   the United States is bound.

20        Ambassador Keyes. Well, I think, as Ambassador  
21   Kirkpatrick pointed out, we have a constitutional system in  
22   the United States, we are not responsible for the assumptions  
23   that other people make about it. And I think it is par-  
24   ticularly true that the interlocutors that we have, par-  
25   ticularly those at the U.N., are sophisticated enough to know

1 what they are dealing with. And I wouldn't accept that  
2 excuse.

3       They are sophisticated enough to know what they are  
4 dealing with, they were well-aware of both the complexities  
5 and the requirements of the functioning of our government,  
6 and I think it's indicative of the kind of process and the  
7 stage in the process that we are talking about that there was  
8 not an insistence on--because even in some of the negotiations  
9 I have been involved with in the past, global negotiations,  
10 these sort of things, there was an often an insistence that  
11 there had to be a verified recourse on our part to officials  
12 at the highest level, including the President. That this  
13 appears not to have been insisted upon, not to have been  
14 done, means the negotiations hadn't reached that critical  
15 stage. I mean, I realize that Mr. Cordovez I think has been  
16 telling us that they have been 95 percent complete since  
17 1982--that last 5 percent is obviously very difficult; I  
18 think they have been in a critical stage for several years  
19 now--but they hadn't reached the critical stage at which he  
20 was going to say, all right, I insist that you get this  
21 stamped at the highest level.

22       So I don't think that that is at all unusual in these  
23 diplomatic matters, and I think that the effort to blow up  
24 whatever kind of commitment they may have gotten all out of  
25 proportion is a sign of the eagerness at the moment to try to

1 achieve something at the expense of the real goals of Afghan  
2 freedom and independence, and that we should not be bullied  
3 by that.

4 Senator Humphrey. You are saying, then, that in  
5 practical terms, legal terms, that the United States has a  
6 very great deal of latitude to modify the agreements as they  
7 now stand?

8 Ambassador Keyes. I believe that the President has the  
9 latitude to modify the agreements and to insist on an  
10 agreement that will achieve the goals for which the Afghan  
11 people have been fighting rather than the goals of Soviet  
12 policy, yes.

13 Senator Humphrey. And there can be no legalistic excuse  
14 for not doing just that?

15 Ambassador Keyes. I certainly don't think that a  
16 commitment made in a very nebulous, vague context, a fluid  
17 context, by lower level officials of the U.S. government,  
18 outside the context of any formally concluded agreement of  
19 any kind can be taken as binding upon this government.

20 Senator Humphrey. Then why have we had so many vague  
21 statements on this point in the last several months?

22 Ambassador Keyes. Well, I think, in my own opinion,  
23 that you do have to take account of the fact that our  
24 government works the way that it does, that there are some  
25 folks who seem to be very interested in producing an agree-

1 ment--I don't want to say "any agreement," but in producing  
2 an agreement posthaste, perhaps without the kind of careful  
3 attention that needs to be paid to our own interests, and  
4 that, of course, this interpretation of some commitment we  
5 have made would be calculated to try to put pressure both on  
6 us and on Pakistan not to continue to address some of the  
7 issues of basic concern. As I say, I'm afraid I'd have to  
8 agree here with Ambassador Kirkpatrick that we should not be  
9 so bullied, we should not allow that pressure to develop. I  
10 think that the only pressure that should be serious on  
11 American negotiators when they sit down at the table is the  
12 pressure of American interests, the pressures of the interests  
13 of the friends and partners we have been supporting. And if  
14 agreement doesn't serve those interests, then it is unaccep-  
15 table.

16 And I think clearly that the proposal the Soviets have  
17 put forward, the rumored proposals that have been floating  
18 around, do not, as reported, serve those interests. And I  
19 would certainly say that the President is free to insist on  
20 an agreement that does.

21 Senator Humphrey. Finally, how can we, to raise a point  
22 that you raised yourself--how can we involve the resistance  
23 meaningfully at this point in these negotiations which will  
24 determine the future of their country? You expressed concern  
25 on that point. What do we do at this point? I've been

1 complaining about that for years. What do we do now?

2 Ambassador Keyes. Well, I think I do have serious  
3 concerns there. I think that we have to respect and ap-  
4 preciate the role that the government of Pakistan has played  
5 both in these negotiations and in this overall situation.  
6 And I would heartily agree with both Mr. Brzezinski and  
7 Ambassador Kirkpatrick when they point out that we have very  
8 vital geostrategic interests in Pakistan, with Pakistan, that  
9 we cannot afford to ignore.

10 That being said, it's clear that, given the role  
11 Pakistan has played, cooperation, consultation between  
12 Pakistan and the resistance is vital.

13 I would have to say, though, that I think a step--  
14 especially if you are envisaging an agreement, starting to  
15 think about a post-withdrawal period, that something needs to  
16 be done to address the formal status of the Afghan resistance  
17 as representative somehow of the Afghan people. At one time  
18 --and if the negotiations should happen to fall apart, I  
19 think I would be in favor of this again--it did seem to me  
20 advisable to look at some of the past models we've had in  
21 these things. Senator Hecht mentioned the postwar period in  
22 eastern Europe. Well, at least for a time the eastern  
23 European countries had the advantage of having governments in  
24 exile during the war, and, as I recall, when those governments  
25 in exile were finally in various ways disrupted and disbanded



1 and you got all these Popular Front coalitions, that is when  
2 their freedom was finally and ultimately subverted.

3 So I think one would have to begin thinking about how  
4 one formalizes, in a political sense, the position of the  
5 Afghan resistance, whether as part of a withdrawal agreement,  
6 but certainly as part of any effort to address the context in  
7 the post-withdrawal period. That's what I think is at least  
8 partly at the bottom of the Pakistani concern about a  
9 transitional government.

10 But, as I say, a transitional coalition government may  
11 not be the only way to address it. But clearly one needs to  
12 have some formal political status that recognizes the  
13 representative character of the resistance, and I think the  
14 presumptive legitimacy of the resistance as the heirs to  
15 political authority in Afghanistan.

16 Senator Humphrey. Well, thank you very much, Mr.  
17 Ambassador, your testimony was valuable.

18 Ambassador Keyes. Thank you, Senator.

19 Senator Humphrey. Our next witness is Mr. Alex Alexiev.  
20 Mr. Alexiev, thank you for your patience. Mr. Alexiev is the  
21 senior Soviet analyst with the Rand Corporation.

22

1 STATEMENT OF ALEX ALEXIEV, SENIOR SOVIET ANALYST,  
2 RAND CORPORATION

3 Mr. Alexiev. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Many of the  
4 points that I wanted to address have been addressed by my  
5 fellow witnesses very eloquently, and I would just like to  
6 summarize my own views on the Soviet position in Afghanistan  
7 today, and then address the question of U.S. policy toward  
8 the conflict.

9 I think there is one fact that is perhaps the most  
10 important one, and one that explains more than anything else  
11 why the Soviets are now eager to withdraw. It is that Soviet  
12 strategy for winning in Afghanistan has failed. In my  
13 opinion, their position in Afghanistan, both politically and  
14 militarily, at the present point is rather untenable, and,  
15 more importantly, they see no prospects in the immediate  
16 future to win directly.

17 There are three major areas in which I think their  
18 strategy has failed. Militarily their position is deteriorat-  
19 ing, even though, contrary to what many people have assumed,  
20 they have operated in Afghanistan at a maximum level that the  
21 infrastructure, the military infrastructure, logistic  
22 infrastructure, would allow them; in other words, if they  
23 have not won, it is not for lack of trying. They have done  
24 everything possible but drop nuclear bombs on the Afghans to  
25 win militarily. They have not been able to do that. They

1 continue to conduct military operations of the kind that they  
2 have for a long time, including indiscriminate bombing of  
3 civilians. I was about a week ago at the border when the  
4 14,000 refugees from the Zadran tribe came out of Afghanistan,  
5 and they are now there, after having their villages bombed by  
6 the Soviets over a period of a month and a half during the  
7 host operation. Close to two and a half thousand people were  
8 killed, according to the tribal chief that I interviewed.

9 In other words, that is still part of the Soviet  
10 strategy. Nonetheless, the military situation is deteriorat-  
11 ing because the Afghans, for the first time, do have an  
12 effective antiaircraft capability, and are acquiring other  
13 effective long-range weapons. In other words, the Soviet  
14 position is not likely to improve dramatically in the future.

15 Senator Humphrey. Permit me to interrupt you, inasmuch  
16 as no other Members are here. The situation you have just  
17 described is one that has obtained now for some years, has it  
18 not?

19 Mr. Alexiev. Yes.

20 Senator Humphrey. Why are the Soviets now willing to  
21 withdraw? First of all, do you think they are sincere about  
22 withdrawing, and, if so--.

23 Mr. Alexiev. I think their situation has deteriorated  
24 considerably over the past year. I don't think it's correct  
25 to say that they have been at the same situation militarily

1 for a number of years. Their situation started deteriorating  
2 dramatically in the fall of 1986 with the arrival of the  
3 first Stingers there. Since then, they have lost effective  
4 air superiority, which was a key requirement for effective  
5 counter-insurgency operations; in other words, they don't  
6 have these capabilities any longer.

7 If the Mujahideen now acquire effective long-range  
8 weapons, as has been widely rumored in Peshawar, that would  
9 allow them to in fact bottle up Soviet air bases, the Soviets  
10 are indeed in very serious trouble logistically as well.

11 So the situation for the Soviets militarily has deterio-  
12 rated significantly over the past year and several months.

13 Senator Humphrey. So the situation has not been pretty  
14 much static as I suggested. It has changed in an important  
15 way in the last year and a half, coincident with the arrival  
16 of the Stinger missile.

17 Mr. Alexiev. Yes. And also there are other factors  
18 involved in that, such as the better organization of the  
19 Mujahideen, growing professionalism on their part--as, for  
20 example, in the northeast part of the country where Ahmed  
21 Shah Massoud has organized essentially the resistance in five  
22 provinces now. And also another important factor is the  
23 deteriorating morale and motivation of the Soviet forces  
24 themselves--and that's another subject that we don't have  
25 time to discuss here, but I have just concluded a study of

1 Soviet performance in Afghanistan. There is no question that  
2 the morale of Soviet forces has deteriorated rather seriously.

3 The other factor that I think has contributed to a  
4 Soviet, if you will, strategic failure to achieve their goals  
5 is their inability to make political inroads inside Afghanis-  
6 tan in terms of co-opting sufficient elements of the Afghan  
7 society and turn that war into a civil war, which has always  
8 been their strategy when confronting anticommunist insurgen-  
9 cies. A policy of reconciliation has turned out to be a  
10 flop, and it's not likely that it holds much promise for the  
11 future.

12 The third element that has worked to the detriment of  
13 the Soviets, to the achievement of their goals by their,  
14 direct presence, is the growing domestic impact of the war in  
15 Afghanistan in the Soviet Union. Courtesy of glasnost, as we  
16 all know, they have started talking about it much more than  
17 they have before, and there is now tangible evidence that the  
18 impact of Afghanistan is more than negligible. This is not  
19 to say that it's anywhere near the Vietnam syndrome in this  
20 country; nonetheless, it's important. It is also important  
21 because, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick mentioned, the continuing  
22 Soviet presence in Afghanistan is detrimental to Gorbachev's  
23 push, to Gorbachev's campaign to present the Soviet Union as  
24 peace-loving, as a different type of country under his slogan  
25 of "new political thinking." There has been nothing new

1 about his political thinking in Afghanistan.

2 And for a combination of these reasons I think that they  
3 have come to the conclusion that they have to pull out from  
4 Afghanistan. This is not to say that they have given up on  
5 continuing to have an influence in Afghanistan. And this is  
6 the key point.

7 In other words, as Congressman Wilson mentioned, I think  
8 it's very important to realize that it is the Soviets that  
9 are in a bind in Afghanistan, and it's not us, and it is not  
10 in fact the Afghan Mujahideen at some point--things seem to  
11 be going their way.

12 And our policy should not be one to in effect aid the  
13 Soviets to extract themselves from the bind they are in and  
14 still achieve some of their objectives.

15 Senator Humphrey. Yes.

16 Mr. Alexiev. What do the Soviets hope to salvage out of  
17 their misadventure in Afghanistan? I think simply an  
18 acceptable solution that would guarantee the continuing  
19 presence of a Communist or a Communist-dominated or Soviet-  
20 dominated regime in Afghanistan, at the very least a regime  
21 very friendly to the Soviets.

22 How do they expect to do that? I think they have  
23 realized at this point that the only way that they could do  
24 that is with western help--by that I mean U.S., Pakistan,  
25 international opinion, what have you.

1 And there are four points on their present agenda, in my  
2 opinion. Number one, pressure Pakistan; number two, make the  
3 United States co-responsible for the continuation of the  
4 conflict in Afghanistan; number three, weaken the Afghan  
5 resistance militarily and politically; and, number four,  
6 create conditions inside Afghanistan that would ensure the  
7 survival of a friendly regime.

8 The intimidation campaign of Pakistan has continued  
9 politically. What is not generally known is that the state-  
10 sponsored terrorist campaign against Afghanistan has been  
11 intensified dramatically at exactly the same time as these  
12 peace initiatives have been discussed. I spent three weeks  
13 in Afghanistan until about a week ago, and in the period that  
14 I was there over one hundred people were killed by bombs and  
15 assassinations that were clearly conducted by the agents of  
16 the Afghan security service, which in turn is directly  
17 controlled by the KGB. These things are not accidental  
18 terrorist acts; they are well-coordinated and encouraged by  
19 the Soviets, in my opinion. In fact, the Pakistani police  
20 arrested a terrorist two weeks ago who, among other things,  
21 admitted that people like him are paid considerable sums of  
22 money--number one, they are paid a monthly retainer; for  
23 every successful bombing they are able to conduct--in other  
24 words, if they are able to let a bomb off--they get the  
25 equivalent of \$6000, which for Pakistan is a rather substan-

1 tial amount; and for every person that is killed in such a  
2 bomb they get an additional \$600. That is to say that a  
3 terrorist, an agent that is able to let off a bomb in, let's  
4 say, Peshawar's bazaar, as it happened two weeks ago, and  
5 kill ten people, is basically guaranteed a fortune by  
6 Pakistani standards.

7       So this is an aspect of the Soviet behavior of late that  
8 has not been receiving the necessary publicity or attention  
9 in the west.

10       The other part of the pressure on Pakistan is what has  
11 been discussed in considerable here, and I'm not going to go  
12 into that--that is to pressure Pakistan into accepting a  
13 Communist-dominated interim government in Kabul. This I  
14 think is very important to the Soviets, for two reasons:  
15 number one, because it confers a kind of legitimacy on the  
16 regime that it has lacked, that it is not likely to acquire  
17 on its own; number two, the Soviets know very well that any  
18 government of that nature would be totally unacceptable to  
19 the Mujahideen. That's a key point. Let's not forget that  
20 the Pakistanis are very concerned about a government in which  
21 there are Communist elements, because the Mujahideen would  
22 not agree to it. And I have talked to any number of them  
23 just recently who will tell you flat out: this is not  
24 something that we have anything to do with. And they tell  
25 you that the resistance started long before the Soviet.



1 invasion, against people like Najibullah, who is personally  
2 responsible, as the chairman of the security service, for the  
3 killings and torture and mutilations of countless Afghans.  
4 To expect them to agree to any sort of a deal that includes  
5 the perpetuation of people like that in power is just totally  
6 unrealistic, in my opinion.

7 And that's why I think we should be very concerned about  
8 efforts to pressure Pakistan into accepting just such a deal.

9 The other part of the Soviet strategy, as I mentioned,  
10 is to try to weaken the resistance, both militarily and  
11 politically. How is that going to be done? That strategy  
12 paradoxically--but perhaps not so paradoxically--depends on  
13 U.S. acquiescence, in my opinion.

14 There are three points to it. Number one guarantee a  
15 deal--have the United States guarantee a deal to which the  
16 resistance is not a part. This has already happened, and I  
17 think that was very unfortunate, because, as the resistance  
18 leaders will tell you and everybody associated with them will  
19 tell you, there are only two parties to the conflict in  
20 Afghanistan: the Soviet Union and the Afghan people as  
21 represented by the Afghan resistance. There are no other  
22 parties to the conflict--there are supporting actors. But  
23 the two main actors are those two.

24 And to have an agreement that does not include formally  
25 one of the two parties is to guarantee that it is not going

1 to be acceptable to that one party. And it's a great  
2 problem, it seems to me, that we have in fact agreed to  
3 guarantee such a deal. This in itself creates possible  
4 problems later on that we may discuss.

5 Number two, the agreement to cut off supplies to the  
6 Mujahideen at the beginning of a protracted Soviet pullout  
7 is, I think, a very, very unwise move.

8 Let me just mention here something that has not been  
9 mentioned, and that is even militarily it is, in my opinion,  
10 a very unwise move, because at present less than 20 percent  
11 of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan actually do any fighting  
12 or any counter-insurgency fighting; these are the so-called  
13 counter-insurgency forces that consist of the airborne  
14 troops, the air assault troops, and the independent reconnais-  
15 sance units. That is to say that even if the Soviets pull  
16 out half of their troops, they will still have essentially  
17 the same military capability to inflict damage on the  
18 Afghans, who in the meantime would have been cut off from  
19 Stingers, whose ammunition supply very likely would have been  
20 depleted; in other words, they will be a much easier prey for  
21 the Soviets. And let's not forget that a substantial part of  
22 the Soviet military capability that is brought to bear on the  
23 Afghans is in fact located in the Soviet Union. Much of the  
24 air assets operate from behind the Amu Darya, many of the  
25 counter-insurgency forces again are flown into Afghanistan

1 for operations and withdrawn--so this is a point that is not,  
2 it seems to me, well understood.

3 Senator Humphrey. Mr. Alexiev, would you amplify your  
4 remarks on the continued capability of Soviet forces, even  
5 after the first contingents have been withdrawn? I mean, we  
6 don't know the agreement, but, as I understand it, some  
7 50,000 are supposed to be withdrawn very early. Are you  
8 saying that even after that withdrawal of 50,000, if that is  
9 correct, that the combat capability would remain the same?

10 Mr. Alexiev. Yes.

11 Senator Humphrey. Why is that?

12 Mr. Alexiev. My research indicates that at present the  
13 vast majority of counter-insurgency operations--in other,  
14 words, operations against the resistance as such, as opposed  
15 to security duties, occupation duties, etcetera--are conducted  
16 by a small percentage of the Soviet force.

17 Senator Humphrey. Who would not be withdrawn in this  
18 first--.

19 Mr. Alexiev. We do not know that, but it is logical to  
20 assume that the Soviets would not want to do that, if they  
21 want to maintain their capability. These forces consist of  
22 one airborne division, the 105th, and a substantial part of a  
23 second one, the 103rd, close to 10,000 people; about 5,000  
24 people in two air assault brigades, and possibly a third one;  
25 and another 4,000 people or so in independent reconnaissance

1 units. My estimate is that these forces are about 18,000, in  
2 other words, quite a bit less than 20 percent of the Soviet  
3 force.

4 What I am trying to say here is that even if they  
5 withdraw 50,000 of their troops that presently are concerned  
6 with occupation duties, their military capabilities vis-a-vis  
7 the resistance would not deteriorate dramatically.

8 Senator Humphrey. Well, how should this front-loading,  
9 as it is called, be designed to ensure that it works as  
10 intended?

11 Mr. Alexiev. If it were to make any sense, in my  
12 opinion there should be some arrangements to have these  
13 forces--.

14 Senator Humphrey. Specific units.

15 Mr. Alexiev. These specific units withdrawn at the very  
16 beginning. We know where they are, we know where they are  
17 stationed, and it is not a very difficult--.

18 Senator Humphrey. Will you provide me a proposed list  
19 of such units that ought to be withdrawn?

20 Mr. Alexiev. Yes, I can do that. The airborne divisions  
21 are very easily identifiable, and the air assault units as  
22 well. The independent reconnaissance units are an integral  
23 part of motorized rifle units, and it is much more difficult  
24 to do there. However, if you do withdraw the airborne units  
25 and the air assault units, I think Soviet capabilities will

1 be dramatically diminished. In fact, I have indirect  
2 evidence that exactly the point we are discussing may in fact  
3 be considered during the battle of Kost [phonetic]; the  
4 Mujahideen captured a Soviet outpost--among other things,  
5 they captured a bunch of letters that Soviet soldiers had  
6 written but not mailed. And I was given those letters, and  
7 these people are paratroopers. And in a couple of letters  
8 they write to their loved ones that they have heard of rumors  
9 of withdrawals, but they said we were sent here first and we  
10 will probably be pulled out last. And I think that is  
11 probably what they may have in fact been told. And it is an  
12 important consideration.

13 Let me talk just briefly about some of the problems that  
14 a deal of the kind that is now being debated may cause for  
15 us, with the resistance.

16 Number one, as I mentioned, the cut-off of supplies not  
17 only has the potential of seriously weakening the resistance,  
18 but it has another possible impact that has not been discussed  
19 here that I think is very serious, and that is if indeed  
20 there is some sort of agreement or implicit agreement that  
21 not only would we cut off the Mujahideen supplies but in fact  
22 try to interfere with their access to Afghanistan, with their  
23 logistic infrastructure inside of Afghanistan--and I think  
24 Dr. Brzezinski cited this Pravda article which in fact is  
25 very disturbing, because it indicates that at least the

1 Soviets believe that there is some sort of an agreement to  
2 that effect. And let me read that to you again. Discussing  
3 the arrangement according to which an agreement will be  
4 signed on March 1 and withdrawals will start on May 1--and  
5 this was the first time a specific date was mentioned in the  
6 Soviet press, the first page in Pravda, which means it's  
7 authoritative. The article simply said: "This two-month  
8 period is not accidental. It is needed to give Islamabad  
9 time to demolish the dushman [i.e., bandit] bases on its  
10 territory."

11 This, to me, is a very disturbing statement, because if  
12 there is anything behind it, the potential of violence  
13 spilling over from Afghanistan into Pakistan is a very real  
14 one. I don't think that the Mujahideen would take kindly to  
15 anybody trying to interrupt their movements and their  
16 supplies while the Soviets are still in the country, and we  
17 cannot expect to.

18 If you have even the slightest amount of violence  
19 spilling over on the Pakistani side, I think the Soviet  
20 dilemma would be largely ameliorated, and we will have a  
21 major dilemma on our hands, because for one thing we would  
22 have signed an agreement that is presented to the American  
23 people as a reasonable one, as a good deal, and all of a  
24 sudden it is the Mujahideen that supposedly are injuring it.

1 right now, but they are very serious, in my opinion.

2 Well, let me conclude here. A solution along the lines  
3 that have been discussed in the press, in my opinion would  
4 not guarantee peace but very likely continued bloodshed in  
5 Afghanistan. The only solution that I can see that will  
6 guarantee peace--and that is what we should be very clear  
7 about--is an unconditional Soviet withdrawal.

8 Now, we should and probably will be able to work with  
9 the Mujahideen to guarantee the Soviets' safe passage out of  
10 the country, hopefully with the puppet regime in their  
11 baggage train. But that, I believe, is the only reasonable  
12 chance that bloodshed would in fact stop in Afghanistan.  
13 Otherwise I am afraid we may end up in a situation where  
14 there will be protracted conflict that may not work to the  
15 benefit of the freedom fighters, as the situation does now,  
16 in my opinion.

17 And I think, as you mentioned in your opening statement,  
18 it would really be unconscionable if the Soviets were allowed  
19 to achieve by means of negotiations what they have not been  
20 able to achieve on the battlefield at the cost of one and a  
21 quarter million Afghans.

22 Thank you.

23 Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Mr. Alexiev, for your  
24 excellent statement. I have a number of questions.

25 First of all, do the recent Soviet statements on the

1 part of Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Gorbachev to the effect that  
2 there are no preconditions with regard to a surviving regime  
3 represent something new and important?

4 Mr. Alexiev. If they were in fact meant, if they were  
5 in fact representative of the true Soviet beliefs, then they  
6 would be very important. On the other hand, there is  
7 considerable room to doubt their authenticity, because, very  
8 simply, if the Soviets were not interested in what regime  
9 would follow after their withdrawal, they would not be making  
10 the preconditions that they are now making, i.e., a cut-off  
11 of Mujahideen supplies. All they would ask for is safe  
12 passage--and they would be given that.

13 But the effort to weaken the resistance, which I think  
14 their negotiating position now is interested in, is to me an  
15 indication that they are very keenly interested in what  
16 government will be established in the wake of their withdraw-  
17 al, and they would certainly like to have a friendly govern-  
18 ment.

19 Let me just as a footnote mention here that there is  
20 another development that has not received adequate press,  
21 certainly in this country, and that is that as the Soviets  
22 have told us time and again, that the political decision to  
23 pull out has been made a long time ago, that they are not in  
24 fact interested in who will become boss in Kabul--at the same  
25 time you have a campaign to increase the so-called patronage



1 ties between individual Soviet republics and Afghan provinces.  
2 In fact, interestingly enough, only several days after  
3 Shevardnadze met Mr. Armacost in December, there was a  
4 Central Committee meeting in Moscow, I believe on December  
5 16, which was chaired by Ligachov, the number two man in the  
6 party, and was attended by all the top Soviet leaders, except  
7 Gorbachev, with only one item on the agenda--and that was  
8 increasing patronage ties between Soviet republics and Afghan  
9 provinces. And to date a number of agreements have been  
10 signed.

11 To me it is an indication of not only continuing  
12 interest but in fact an effort to establish a more direct  
13 Soviet influence in a variety of places that does not depend  
14 on the Kabul regime; in fact, perhaps to co-opt, try to co-  
15 opt, bribe, some of the local leaders. And that again does  
16 not indicate to me, certainly not to my satisfaction, that  
17 the Soviets are disinterested in the future government in  
18 Kabul.

19 Senator Humphrey. Well, no one thinks they are disinter-  
20 ested. But give us a couple of examples of these patronage  
21 ties, and also they would have no force once the PDPA regime  
22 is overthrown, would they?

23 Mr. Alexiev. No, I don't think they would have any  
24 force at all. To the extent that--I think any representative  
25 government that comes to Kabul will probably almost

1 immediately abrogate any treaties signed by--.

2 Senator Humphrey. So if we get a clean withdrawal, if  
3 we get a real complete withdrawal on the part of the Soviets,  
4 then these patronage ties are gone anyway.

5 Mr. Alexiev. Yes, they are. But what's important to me  
6 is the fact that the Soviets are still pursuing these things  
7 at this very late hour. The fact that they will have a  
8 Central Committee meeting with all these high-powered  
9 individuals dedicated to just this one item is an indication  
10 to me that they take this problem seriously.

11 Senator Humphrey. No question, the Soviets are deter-  
12 mined to carry on the war by other means--no question in my  
13 mind, at least, and I think in yours.

14 Well, give us your opinion on a couple of likely  
15 scenarios. First, if an agreement is effectuated requiring  
16 an immediate cut-off of outside assistance, how would you see  
17 things happening? What do you think is the most likely  
18 scenario?

19 Mr. Alexiev. Under the current ten-month period?

20 Senator Humphrey. Yes.

21 Mr. Alexiev. Again, I'm afraid that under a ten-month  
22 Soviet withdrawal plan, this does not bode well for the  
23 resistance. Under a three-month agreement, as Dr. Brzezinski  
24 mentioned, that is a different point, and that may be  
25 something that I would be willing to consider personally,

1 because if we are able to provide sufficient supplies for the  
2 Mujahideen to last three months, then the problem would be a  
3 less serious one.

4 Under a ten-month agreement, again I think you have the  
5 possibility of (a) a military weakening of the resistance,  
6 (b) a resistance refusal to recognize the treaty as in fact a  
7 legitimate one, and therefore perhaps injuring some of its  
8 clauses, which in turn gives the Soviets a ready-made excuse  
9 to renege on the deal any time they felt like it, and present  
10 the Mujahideen as the intractable party, which puts us in a  
11 very serious conflict, I think, because all of a sudden we in  
12 effect would have to take the Soviet side by claiming that,  
13 well, the agreement was violated by the Mujahideen.

14 Senator Humphrey. Therefore your bottom-line conclusion  
15 with respect to a ten-month withdrawal and for up-front cut-  
16 off of outside assistance is that it would so dangerously  
17 weaken the resistance as to bring about a collapse of the  
18 whole arrangement and a cessation of Soviet withdrawal; is  
19 that your point?

20 Mr. Alexiev. It is certainly a possibility, it is  
21 certainly a possibility. I don't think anybody knows exactly  
22 what would happen.

23 Senator Humphrey. I know, I'm asking your opinion. Do  
24 you think that's the likely result, or a remote result?

25 Mr. Alexiev. I think there is a good chance that such

1 an agreement would not result in a cessation of hostilities.  
2 And if hostilities continue under these circumstances, the  
3 Afghan resistance would be in a weaker condition than they  
4 are now.

5 Senator Humphrey. Yes, no question.

6 Mr. Alexiev. And also politically very importantly,  
7 because the consensus, the truly remarkable bipartisan  
8 consensus that has existed for example in Congress in this  
9 country is likely to be undermined. And I think you already  
10 are seeing some of these things happening in Congress that  
11 may be the beginning of that process.

12 Senator Humphrey. Well, if you had deceit on your mind  
13 and you were a Soviet planner, how would you plan things to  
14 happen?

15 Mr. Alexiev. Well, I would like to have a situation  
16 where I can drive a wedge between the resistance and its  
17 supporters--number one, Pakistan and the United States;  
18 present the Afghans, the resistance, as the intractable  
19 party; try to create perhaps serious problems, to the extent  
20 its possible violence spilling over into Pakistan; try to  
21 encourage a climate in the United States Congress of at least  
22 partial sympathy with the Soviet position; and, at the same  
23 time, weaken the resistance militarily while trying to prop  
24 up, to the extent possible, the regime. And let's not forget  
25 that even though I believe that if the Soviets withdraw

1 tomorrow, the regime will collapse--there's no question about  
2 it--and that the Afghan army is not what I would call a  
3 feasible army, there are elements that have a vested interest  
4 in the survival of the regime, those that would otherwise be  
5 killed. I mean here primarily the members of the Afghan  
6 security service, and there are about 30,000 or 40,000 of  
7 them, and these people would be willing to do anything  
8 possible to avoid a collapse of the regime. What I am saying  
9 is, if the resistance is weakened, if it is embroiled in  
10 conflicts with its erstwhile supporters, if its supplies are  
11 endangered, this may give some succor and some hope to the  
12 Communist government in Kabul that they may indeed have a  
13 chance of maintaining their power. That may encourage some  
14 people that are now sitting on the fence, so to say, to make  
15 a deal with the Kabul regime.

16 So even though I doubt that they can really establish a  
17 viable government, they may protract the conflict until such  
18 a point when the international support for the resistance is  
19 really undermined in a serious way.

20 Senator Humphrey. Well, you have pointed out some very  
21 worrisome dangers and underscored the need to improve upon  
22 the agreements as they now stand--as we understand they now  
23 stand.

24 I want to say for the benefit of the Soviets, who no  
25 doubt will be listening to what has been said here, and

1 reading about what has been said here, that if they are  
2 sincere in their wish to make a clean break and to withdraw,  
3 I think they will find support among Members of Congress to  
4 facilitate such a withdrawal, that there is not, as the  
5 Soviets probably suspect, a wish to continue bleeding Soviet  
6 troops--that has never been my wish nor, in my opinion, the  
7 wish of any Member of Congress. I was in Moscow in connection  
8 with this problem, as well as Kabul and Islamabad and  
9 Beijing, some months ago, and noticed that, were it not for  
10 the uniforms, you really couldn't tell the difference between  
11 Soviet soldiers and Americans by their appearance--and I am  
12 sure that is so of the parents and families of these soldiers  
13 as well, and they don't want their children dying in stupid  
14 wars any more than we do, and we don't want them dying in  
15 stupid wars either. There is no wish to bleed the Soviet  
16 Union; angry as we are at the injustice and the tragedy they  
17 have wrought in Afghanistan, we do not wish to bleed them.  
18 If they wish to withdraw cleanly, honestly, then we will help  
19 them facilitate such a withdrawal.

20 But, given the sorry record of Soviet deceit, we have to  
21 be very careful and we have to bring increased pressure upon  
22 our government, I believe, to secure decent agreements, to  
23 use the term of Ambassador Kirkpatrick--and to use one which  
24 she was reluctant to use, I would describe the current  
25 arrangement as decidedly indecent and unjust and dangerous.

1 Thank you very much.

2 Before we disband completely, I want to thank Rosanne  
3 Klass for her help in many ways and on many occasions over  
4 the years, and in particular today for arousing greater  
5 interest amongst the press than perhaps would have been  
6 possible without her help. Thank you.

7 [The hearing adjourned at 1:12 p.m.]

8

